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ABSTRACT
The involvement of children in conflict is not a recent phenomenon. The military use of
children dates back to ancient times. The change of warfare and the advocating of the
protection of children's rights within the global discourse context have taken the
discourse on child and youth involvement in conflict out of the political and military
context and placed it into one circumscribed by legal and moral concern. Since the late
1970s, a number of international instruments have been promulgated to limit the
recruitment of child soldiers, but even though the numbers of children being recruited
into armed forces have decreased, children continue to be deployed into armed forces,
particularly in Africa. 'Loopholes', vagueness and inconsistencies in the treaties and the
strengths and weaknesses of the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have created
legal uncertainty which have ultimately resulted in further injustice for the child.
However, legal uncertainty is not per se the cause of recruitment continuing; the cause
being more complex. Researches and treaties have failed to address the obstacles to the
implementation of the relevant international law. The issue(s) of culture and child cross-
border recruitment have served as obstacles to an effective protection of children against
recruitment by international law.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC
A 'child soldier' is commonly defined as any person below 18 years of age who is recruited
into an armed force for the purposes of either, direct or indirect (or even both) participation
in hostilities. \ The prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers has been explicitly
repeated by the international community in various international human rights,
humanitarian, criminal law and even labour treaties? Yet, despite this wealth of
international law providing for the protection of children against recruitment, in several
countries in Africa (as well as in other parts of the world) the recruitment of child soldiers
. 3
IS on a rampage.
This dissertation is centred on the effectiveness of international law in respect of the
protection of children against being recruited into armed forces, particularly in Africa. The
researcher will investigate the contribution of the inefficiency of international law in the
continuation of recruitment and discuss potential solutions. The angle of the investigation
will be from a perspective of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, the
researcher will examine the obstacles to its implementation, particularly aspects less
explored - the issue(s) of culture and child cross-border recruitment - and also discuss
possible solutions. The research conQludes with recommendations based on the research
findings.
As indicated above, this research will focus on Africa. The motivation for this choice is
that, although the issue of 'child soldiers' is not peculiar to Africa, research has shown that
this problem is critical on this continent.4 An astonishing part of the African continent has
been at war, both inter- and intra- state conflicts, for the past decades. In 1992, Africa was
declared the most violent continent in the world, and in 1993, 11 of the 26 major conflicts
in the world occurred in Africa. 5 A common feature of these conflicts is the extensive
I This is the definition ofa 'child soldier' as developed in 1997 during the Cape Town Conference on Child
Soldiers and it has become the standard universal definition. http://childsoldierrelief.com/2008/07/22/official-
definition-of-a-child-soldier-from-cape-town-principles/ (accessed 5 February 2009).
2 S. Tiefenbrum "Child soldiers, slavery and the trafficking of children' (2008) Fordham International Law
Journal 415, 434.
3 D. Singh 'When a child is not a child: The scourge of child soldiering in Africa' (2007) 7 African Human
Rights Law Journal 206, 206.
4 Ibid.
5 A. Sesay et al 'Liberian Child Coldiers: Prospects and Problems' (2000) Scientia Militaria 30(1) 44,44.
recruitment of the child soldiers. It has been estimated that there are approximately 300,
000 child soldiers worldwide, of which half are in Africa.6 However, reliable statistics and
documents are inadequate since most armed forces; including government forces, deny that
they are recruiting children. As a result, the precise number of child soldiers cannot be
assessed and, therefore, they remain 'invisible'. 7
The Organisation of the African Union (OAU) States have adopted the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Charter),8 which creates a more stringent
protection against recruitment of Afrioan children, 9 as compared to the other treaties that
prohibit the recruitment of children into armed forces. 10 The African Charter has adopted a
'straight 18' position, which is compliant with the overall definition of a child. 1I
Furthermore, it is the only charter at a regional level dealing with the issue of child
soldiering and children in armed conflict. The Charter compositely addresses both issues
of age and nature of hostilities that appear to confound the other treaties. 12
Despite this, recruitment of child soldiers continues to be a problem in Africa because, inter
alia, political support to stop the tendency towards recruiting children is missing. When
desperate to 'refill', government forces themselves give way to the temptation of recruiting
children into their forces. 13 The African Charter is not the only international convention
relevant for the protection of children against recruitment to which the African countries
6 G. M. Musila, 'Challenges in establishing the accountability of child soldiers for human rights violations:
Restorative justice as an option' (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 321, 322.
7 A. Twun-Dauso 'Africa's Young Soldiers: The Co-option of Childhood' (2003) Monograph 82 Institutefor
Security Studies, 1, 12.
8 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o{the Child, 1990 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) hereafter
the African Charter.
9 The African Charter is the only charter at a regional level dealing with the issue of child soldiering and
children in armed conflict. The Charter does not make the distinction between people younger than 18 years
and those younger than 15 years: A child is simply anyone younger than 18 years. The Charter compositely
addresses both issues of age and nature of hostilities that appear to confound the other treaties.
10 The 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Geneva: United Nations 1125 UNTS 3
(1978) hereafter AP-I, 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Geneva: United
Nations 1125 UNTS 609 (1978) hereafter AP-II, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 Doc
A/RES/44/25 (1989) hereafter the CRC, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1998)
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) hereafter the Rome Statute, define a child as any person under the age of
15, and the other treaties, with the exception of the Rome Statute, do not address both the issues of age and
nature of hostilities.
11 RD. Mezmur 'Children at Both Ends of the Gun: Child Soldiers in Africa' in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed)
Children's Rights in Africa: A legal perspective 199, 202.
12 Singh (see note 3 above) 219.
13 For example, in Uganda, the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF), which is the army of the
government also recruits children into its forces.
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are parties. 14 Despite this apparently strong international commitment, the recruitment of
child soldiers continues to be a problem in Africa.
When discussing the situation on the African continent, the researcher will make repeated
referrals to three countries, namely Uganda, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). This allows for a practical analysis of the problem of child soldiers based
on contemporary examples. These countries are also significant because the recruitment of
children is relatively widespread within their jurisdiction, and they are also parties to the
relevant conventions. IS
Based on the research done thus far, there is an indication that the weaknesses in enforcing
and monitoring international law might have a role in the continuation of child recruitment.
For example, analysing the CRC, African Charter and the Optional Protocol to the CRC,
the main problem in enforcement is that their enforcement mechanism is very weak.
16
The
main mechanism for accountability is reporting, and a report mayor may not be taken
seriously as an enforcement vehicle by the receiving state. 17 Important to note is that
political willingness to adhere to already existing obligations, as well as readiness to think
along new lines, in terms of more effective enforcement mechanisms, are both necessary
prerequisites for improved enforcement. 18
Nevertheless, the African Charter's enforcement mechanisms for accountability are not
restricted to reporting procedure; they also include individual complaints and
investigations. 19 The individual complaints are a powerful mechanism within the African
14They are also party to the AP-I, AP-II, CRC, International Labour Organisation's Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention, 2000 ILO Convention 182. hereafter the ILO Convention 182, Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights ofthe Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 2002 AJRES/54/263
(2002) hereafter the Optional Protocol to the CRC, Rome Statute, and the United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 A/RES/55/25 (2000) hereafter the
Palermo Protocol.
15 International Committee of Red Cross 'Member States to the Following International Humanitarian Law
and Other Related Treaties as of 26-Aug-2009'
'http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/CSPF)/party main treaties/$File/IHL and other related Treaties.pdf, ICRC
'International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents' http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/Pays?ReadForm
accessed on 26 August 2009.
16 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209.
17 Ibid
18Ibid.
19 Article 43, article 44 and article 45.
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Charter; if the Committee were prompt in their considerations of these complaints?O The
issue of individual communications seems to be drawing less attention from the
Committee.2 \ The problem is that the Committee takes long to do the consideration of the
communication; and the longer the Committee takes, the more it allows the perpetuation of
the violation of children's rights.22 Furthermore, article 44(2) states that every
communication 'shall be treated in confidence'. As correctly pointed out by Chirwa, this
principle has been cited as one of the causes that accounted for the ineffectiveness of the
African Commission in the early years of its existence.23 The transparency of the
Committee cannot be monitored if the confidentiality principle were strictly adhered to.
The international criminal law mechanism of accountability is through the prosecution of
those who recruit child soldiers. Recently, there have been a few prosecutions of military
commanders for recruiting child soldiers; and in some cases there have been convictions.
24
The convictions are a positive aspect in the sense that it sends a clear message to the
international community that perpetrators of war crimes will be prosecuted. However, the
acquittals send the opposite message to the international community. Furthermore, the
criminal law mechanism for accountability is usually hampered by the culture of impunity
which is very common in Africa, especially during the peace agreement phase.
As suggested above, this research focuses on the protection against the recruitment of child
soldiers. The issues raised by the situation of child soldiers are very wide. They include
issues of criminal responsibility of the recruiters and the child soldiers, reintegration,
terrorism and responsibility of non-state actors. Due to time and space constraints, this
research will only focus on the protection against recruitment. The choice is also justified
by the importance of recruitment for all other subsequent issues concerning child soldiers.
Recruitment can be seen as the 'foundation' to some of the difficulties raised by the
20 The individual complaints give the Committee 'hands on' on the situation on the ground.
21 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 208. -
22 J. Sloth-Nielsen & RD. Mezmur 'Out of the starting blocks: the 12th and 13th sessions of the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child' (2009) 9(1) African Human Rights Law
Journal 336, 346.
23 D.M. Chirwa 'The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child'
(2002) 10 The International Journal ofChildren 's Rights 157, 170.
24 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & Santige Borbor Kanu SCSL-04-16-Thereafter
CDF judgment, Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T hereafter AFRC judgment
and Prosecutor v Thomas Lubango Dyilo ICC-O l/04-0 1/06
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situation of the child soldiers, thus making it critical to understanding and eliminating the
problem.
Treaties, governmental organisations, -non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic
institutions, security institutes and the media have conducted extensive research on the
phenomenon of child soldiers. However, although these researches and treaties cover a
large spectrum of the problem of child soldering, they merely address the signs, in the
sense of the distinctiveness of a child soldier and often adequately fail to address the
obstacles to the implementation of the relevant international law. Surprisingly, not much
research has been conducted on the role of cultural beliefs in child recruitment,25 Previous
research does not attempt to understand the impact of the lived realities at the local level on
child recruitment in Africa, which sometimes contrasts with the global humanitarian
discourse.26 Important to mention in relation to this is that the approach to understanding
and addressing the issue of child soldiers at global level has been dominated by the rights-
based approach, with no effort made to understand the local approach and experiences of
young people's military recruitment,27
Debates between cultural beliefs and h_uman rights have been put across over the years, but
despite the seriousness of the scourge of child soldiers in Africa, the issue has not been
directly addressed in these debates. In reality, the approach to understanding and
addressing the issue of child soldiers has been dominated by the rights-based approach,
without trying to integrate in this approach the cultural beliefs of the indigenous people?8
The human-rights approach is simplistic and its effectiveness is hampered by some
pervasive cultural practices and attitudes, which command even more legitimacy than the
universal standards for protection of children.29 Implementation depends to a large extent
25 "Cultural beliefs are the accepted customs, institutions, and achievements of a particular nation, group or
society." South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002), Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern
Africa, 2002.
26 Global humanitarian discourse refers to the way in which the subject of 'child soldiers' is generally
depicted and discussed by international organisations, NGOs, governments, as well as popular media. A. Lee
'Understanding and Addressing the Phenomenon of 'Child Soldiers': The Gap between the Global
Humanitarian Discourse and the Local Understandings and Experiences of Young People's Military
Recruitment' Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series No. (2009) 52, 1 fnl.
27 Ibid 1.
28 Ibid. -
29 T Kaime 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of children's rights in
Africa: Some reflection' (2005) 5 (2) African Human Rights Law Journal 221, 226.
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on the level of culturallegitimacy30 accorded to children's rights norms in a society.3} The
fact that some pervasive cultural practices and attitudes command even more legitimacy
than the universal standards for protection of children is the reason why cultural practices
that are more detrimental to children, such as the one at hand, still exist.
32
The dilemma of
child soldiers will not be salvaged if failure to identify and address the obstacles to the
implementation of the relevant international law continues.
Furthermore, international treaties have not addressed the issue of cross-border recruitment,
and not much research has been conducted on it. The issue of cross-border recruitment has
become wide spread in Africa?3 Some of the countries that encounter this practice in
Africa are DRC, Liberia, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone.34 The fact that this issue
is not addressed in international treaties creates an obstacle to the implementation of the
international law under the circumstances. This oversight is problematic in the sense that
the existing international law provisions are difficult to apply in such situations. This
makes it difficult to protect children from cross-border recruitment and to apply
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.
For example, the Palermo Protocol in article 3(c) is the only international document that
mentions the recruitment across borders?5 However, it is of limited use in addressing
cross-border recruitment. This is because the lead in article 3(c) of the Palermo Protocol is
not followed by any substantive provisions.36 Thus, cross-border recruitment makes the
applicability of the existing provision of the Palermo Protocol difficult.37 Furthermore, the
30 "To inquire into the cultural legitimacy of human rights would be quite simply to inquire into the kinds and
degrees of support for human rights standards and for their implementation in 'culture(s)'--be it 'micro-
cultures' of villages or tribes, or 'subcultures' of professions and social classes, or 'national cultures,' or
'regional cultures'." B Ibhawoh 'Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of
Human Rights in the African State' (2000) 22.3 Human Rights Quarterly 838,840.
31 Kaime (note 29 above) 221.
32 Ibid.
33 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209, Sloth-Nielsen 'Children's rights and the law in African context: An
introduction' in J. Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children's Rights in Africa: A legal perspective (2008), Burlington:
Ashgate 53, 59 and Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General: DRC
(2007) UN Document A/62/609-SI2007/757.
34 Human Rights Watch 'Child soldiers' http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crn/index.htm accessed on 8
February 2009.
35 Article 3(c) of the Palermo Protocol states that 'the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered 'trafficking in persons.'
36 Mezmur (note 11 above) 208.
37 Ibid.
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Optional Protocol to the CRC in paragraph 11 of its preamble38 also mentions cross-border
recruitment, but just as with the Palermo Protocol, the lead in the preamble is not followed
by any substantive provisions.39 Unfortunately, the provisions of the preamble do not have
the force of law, as the substantive provisions have.4o A preamble is a clause at the
beginning of a legislative statute explaining its purpose; and it neither confers or increases
powers contained within it and is, therefore, not an essential element ofit.
41
The practical reason for this dissertation is to fill the gap in the research mentioned above,
firstly, by attempting to understand the impact that the lived realities at the local level have
on child recruitment in Africa and con~equently on the implementation of international law
in this field. The implementation of the relevant international law depends to a large extent
on the level of cultural legitimacy accorded to children's rights norms in a society.42 This
requires an understanding of the impact that the lived realities at the local level have on
child recruitment in Africa, together with solutions and adequate social support for those
involved.43 The failure to understand the impact that the lived realities at the local level has
on child recruitment in Africa can serve as an obstacle to the implementation and
effectiveness of the relevant international law.
Secondly, the practical reason for this dissertation is to fi 11 the gap in the research
mentioned above, by analysing the obstacle created by the omission of cross-border
recruitment in international treaties. This omission makes the applicability of the relevant
international law difficult, and has a negative impact on the effectiveness of international
law in regards to the protection of children from being recruited across borders into armed
forces.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The research has two main objectives, as indicated below.
38 Paragraph II of the Preamble provides 'condemning with the gravest concern the recruitment, training, and
use within and across national border children in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the armed forces of
a State ... '.
39 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 208.
40 Ex parte Johannesburg City Council 1975 (I) SA (W) 817A-818e.
41 Union and Rock Insurance Co. Ltd. v Carmichael's Executor 1917 AD 593 597.
42 '
Kaime (see note 29 above) 221.
43 Ibid.
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Firstly, Chapter 2 of this dissertation contains a critical analysis of the effectiveness of
international law on the protection of children against recruitment in armed forces from the
perspective of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, with focus on Africa. The aim of
this Chapter is to assess whether international law is effective in protecting children against
being recruited into armed forces from the perspective of enforcement and monitoring
mechanisms, in regards to Africa. The critical analysis will provide a good basis for
understanding the 'loopholes', vagueness and inconsistencies in the treaties and the
strengths and weaknesses of the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. These have the
potential of creating legal uncertainty, which will ultimately result in further injustice for
the child.
Secondly, in Chapter 3, the researcher will investigate the obstacles to an effective
protection of children against recruitm~nt by international law, particularly two aspects less
explored - the issue(s) of culture and cross-border recruitment, with focus on Africa. The
objective of this chapter is to assess the impact that the above obstacles have on an
effective implementation of the international law. The investigation will provide a good
basis for understanding why the issue of child soldiers is more critical on this continent.
It is fmally argued that, despite these shortcomings, the development of international law
on the protection of children against recruitment can be viewed as a positive progress.
International law has the potential to reduce the problem of child soldiers, if there is
political support for the governments, adequate social support for those involved, and
commitment from the international community.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
From a methodology point of view, this is a library-based research. A large variety of
national and international sources have- been used. These range from primary sources, such
as international treaties, national legislation, reports, and international cases; to secondary
sources, such as academic writings, media reports, NGO publications and internet sources.
The researcher submitted an ethical clearance form and got the approval to begin on the
dissertation on the 23 rd of July 2009.
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Before discussing the specific issues on which this research focuses, the researcher briefly
gives a historical overview of the cecruitment of child soldiers, looks at the current
recruitment of child soldiers, reviews reasons for joining the armed forces, as well as
discusses the causes for recruitment of child soldiers. An understanding of the current
recruitment issues, reasons for joining the armed forces and the causes for the recruitment
of child soldiers is necessary in an analysis of the effectiveness of international law.
1.4 CURRENT RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS AROUND THE WORLD
The involvement of children in conflict is not a recent phenomenon. The military use of
children dates back to ancient times.44 In medieval Europe, boys as young as 12 years of
age were used as military aides. These children assisted the military in times of war. The
Children's Crusade of 1212 recruited 30 000 children of which many were sold into
slavery.45 During the early days of modem warfare, young boys often took part in battles
mainly as the ever-present 'drummer boys'. 46 The 20th century saw children being
recruited as soldiers in both World War I and World War 11. These children frequently
participated in popular revolutions.47 -Similarly in Africa, throughout history, young men
have played prominent roles in taking weapons to defend their villages.48
Reports from the Human Rights Watch indicate that more than 35 countries around the
world are involved in the practice of recruiting children into armed forces.49 An estimated
300, 000 children have been recruited as soldiers by both rebel groups and government
forces in current armed forces and about 120,000 of them are in Africa. 5o However, the
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has reported a number of more than 500,000
44 For example, in ancient civilization of the Spartans, boys were taken from their homes for military training
at the age of seven. S. Stavrou et al 'The Reintegration of Child Soldiers and Adducted Children: A case
study of Palaro and Pabbo Gala Districtn Northern Uganda' in E. Bennett et al (eds) ACT Against Child
Soldiers in Africa (2000)Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 25.
45 A. Honwana 'Negotiating Post-War Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola' 1999(1)
CODESRJA Bulletin (1999) 1, 4.
46 For example, the French drummer boys who lead Napoleon's initial attack, only to be gunned down by
Allied soldiers.
47 For example, Warsaw Uprisings of 1944 and other anti-fascist movements across Nazi-occupied Europe
during World War 1.
48 D. Zounmenou The United Nations response to the phenomenon ofchild soldiers in Africa: case studies of
Mozambique and Sierra Leone (2001) University of the Witwatersrand, 1,26.
49 Human Rights Watch 'Stop the use of child soldiers: Facts about child soldiers'
http//:www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htmlaccessed on 29 February 2009.
50 Twun-Dauso (see note 7 above) 12.
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children having been recruited in both, state and non-state armed forces III over 85
countries.51
As highlighted above, research has shown that this problem is critical on this continent,52
Africa has the largest number of child soldiers. However, Mengestu argues that, 'what
attracts immediate and superficial attention to Africa's child soldiers ... is that the brutal
existence of a child soldier dovetails neatly with depictions of Africa both as a place born
of hell and misery and as a continent that, like a child, can be saved,.53 Child soldiers are
being recruited into armed forces in countries such as Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. 54 The Ugandan Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), which is a rebel group, is particularly notorious for its recruitment of child
soldiers. 55 It is very disappointing that most of the countries that are involved in the
recruitment of child soldiers are parties to the international law that prohibits the
recruitment of child soldiers. 56 Some of the governments of these countries have even laid
down the minimum age for recruitment57 but at times, these legal limitations are defied at
will and government forces recruit under-aged children.
In Asia thousands of children are recruited into armed forces. 58 Despite government
denials, Myanmar is the only country where government armed forces forcibly recruit
children between the ages of 12 and 18.59 Furthermore, Myanmar is believed to have more
child soldiers (70 000) than any other country in the world.6o Child soldiers also exist in
Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Laos, Sri Lanka and Philippines, where they are mainly
associated with armed opposition groups, factional or clan-based groups or groups
51 IRINnews.org 'Too little to be fighing anyone's wars'
http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/childsoldiers/default.asap 1 accessed on 29 Feb 2009.
52 Singh (see note 3 above) 206.
53 A. Schultheis 'African Child Soldiers and Humanitarian Consumption' (20) Peace Review: A Journal of
Social Justice 31, 33.
54 F. Rialize 'Child soldiers in Mrican Wars' 20097(1) Commonwealth Youth and Development 37,39.
55 Human Rights Watch Country Reports 'Human Rights Children's Rights Project, The Scars of Death:
Children adbucted by the Lord's Resistance in Uganda' (1997) trans HJ Steiner & P Alston, International
Human Rights in Context:Law, Politics, Morals (2000) 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press 531.
56 The African Charter, AP-I, AP-II, CRC, Rome Statute, Optional Protocol to the CRC, ILO Convention 182
and Palermo Protocol.
57 Burundi (16), Angola & Sudan (17), Sierra Leone (17.5), Ethopia, Uganda, Liberia & Rwanda all state that
children under the age of 18 may not be recruited, the DRC & Somalia have no legal limitation on child
recruitment. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 'Africa Report' 2001 htpp://www.child-
soldier.org/reports africa/executive summary.htm accessed on 14 February 2009.




composed of ethnic or religious minorities.61 In Chechnya, under-18s are believed to have
been recruited in a range of armed groups in the war against Russia.
62
1.5 WHY DO CHILDREN JOIN MILITARY GROUPS?
Although war evidently impacts on the community as a whole; children suffer the most
during conflicts. The socio-economic conditions in the States recruiting child soldiers
create an excellent breeding ground for children to be abducted or to volunteer as soldiers -
poverty is endemic, famine is widespread, medical and health conditions are deplorable,
schools are closed or burnt down and thousands of people are displaced.63 Brett argues that
political, economic and social conditions - war, poverty, education, employment and family
- are the primary factors as to why children 'volunteer' to join armed forces. 64 Children in
such an environment are at risk of recruitment, or in their desperation, become receptive to
ideological propaganda encouraging them to enlist, as a gun is often a meal ticket and a
more attractive option than sitting at home being afraid and hopeless.65
Nevertheless, as highlighted above, there are situations were a large number of adolescents
between the ages of 14 and 18 are not forced or coerced into participating in conflict, but
'volunteer' to join up. However, it is misleading to consider this as voluntary participation
as it is often a response to pressure of more subtle nature.66 Children sometimes feel
compelled due to the political, social and economic conditions directing their lives.67
Children who have grown up in war zones perceive this as a normal and permanent way of
life. Being exposed to nothing other than war and fighting, it is almost impossible for the
children to assume any other role than that of a soldier. 68 Furthermore, closely assessed, in
61 R. Brett & I. Specht Young soldiers: Why they choose to fight (2004), Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 23-26.
62 Rialize (see note 54 above) 37.
63 Zounmenou (see note 48 above) 68.
64 R. Brett & I. Specht (see note 61 above) .
65 N. Van Niekerk Weak States and Child Soldiering in Africa: Contextual Factors (2003) University of
Stellenbosch 57.
66 Ibid, 65.
67 Singh (see note 3) 211.
68 For example, in the late 1990s in Uganda, girls where abducted, and became pregnant. They were taken to
special camps in Sudan, where they were cared for by older LRA female commanders until they gave birth.
Their children then became the next generation of the LRA fighters. D Mazurana & S McKay, 'Child
soldiers: What About Girls? (2001) 57(5) Bulletin ofthe Atomatic Scientists 3.
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Cohn and Goodwin-Gilfo are of the opinion that young children do not have sufficient
cognitive capacity to think rationally regarding concepts, such as ideology and nationality,
and suggest that these children are indoctrinated into fighting for the causes. Machel in the
UN Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children Report, dismisses the idea of
'volunteerism' entirely in the context of Africa, disputing that when the only options are
survival or poverty, the choices of the children can hardly be called free and fair. 71
The concept of 'voluntary' participati~n by children is only found in the Optional Protocol
to the CRC. However, to ensure that the recruitment is voluntary, the Optional Protocol
lays down safeguards to be complied with when the member States permit voluntary
recruitment into the armed forces by children below the age of 18.72 In light of these
safeguards, some children would not fall into the category of volunteers at all, especially in
Africa. Firstly, some of these children are living in poverty, and often they are without
parental care, or are refugees, displaced or orphans. Thus, it sounds impractical to expect
them to sign up voluntarily with the consent of their parents or legal guardians.73 In the
same vein, the safeguard that requires reliable proof of age prior to recruitment is not of
much practical help in Africa. Birth registration and identity documents in the continent
are inadequate or non-existent and some children do not know their age. 74 UNICEF has
reported that in Sub-Sahara Africa, 550/0 of children are not registered by their fifth
birthday.75 Since it is not easy to prove a child's age when they volunteer for recruitment,
armed forces might continue with recruitment in the face of lack of proof of age.76
69 Zounmenou (see note 48 above) 34.
70 I. Cohn and G.S. Goodwin Child Soldiers - The Role a/Children in Armed Conflict (1994) New York:
Oxford University Press 35.
71 G. Machel, Report to the Secretary General on the Impact a/Armed Conflicts on Children (1996) New
York: UNICEF 12.
72 Article 3(3) '(a) such recruitment is genuinely voluntary; (b) such recruitment is carried out with the
informed consent of the person's parents or legal guardians; (c) such persons are fully informed of the duties
involved in such military service; (d) such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into
armed military service.'
73 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 205.
74 G. Machel The impact a/war on children (2001), London: Hurst & Company 16.
75 UNICEF(2005) 'The 'Rights' Start to Life: A Statistical Analysis of Birth Registration'
http://www.unicef.org/publications/fileslBirthRegI0a rev.pdf accessed 14 February 2009.
76 Mezmur (note 11 above) 206.
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1.6 CAUSES FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS
There are many reasons - domestic and national - for the recruitment of children,
particularly in African nations, having continued to increase over the years.
77
Children are
easy to recruit and retain as compared to their adult counterparts, since they are generally a
cheap resource, less-demanding and more submissive. The shortage of manpower is
another contributing factor to the recruitment of children into armed forces. Since rebel
forces cannot conscript members of the general public, these rebel groups are the first to
resort to forced recruitment of children.78 Child recruitment is rare in the early stages of
the war. As highlighted in part 1.1, because of the ongoing armed conflicts, the pool of
recruits decreases, and children provide a convenient last resort of fresh recruits to fill the
ranks.79
Technological developments and the proliferation of light, inexpensive weapons in many
African countries in recent years have greatly contributed to the recruitment of child
soldiers.8o The mere fact that children are able to comfortably operate weapons is a factor
that makes them very attractive as recruits. The consequent extensive availability of easy
to use and maintain cheap weapons enables the recruitment of child soldiers on a much
larger scale. Sadly, the advancement to curb the problem of small arms has been hampered
by the fact that some great powers of the world are the suppliers of small arms and light
weapons.8I
The South African government should be applauded for withdrawing its opposition to the
adjudication of the Khulumani lawsuit. 82 The lawsuit is against foreign corporations and
banks,83 which are alleged to have aided and abetted the Apartheid government in enabling
the said government to commit acts of gross human rights violations. 84 This decision opens
77 A.M. Kalis, 'Child soldiers in Africa: solutions to a complex dilemma' (2002) 2 (2) African Journal on
Conflict Resolution.
78 Van Niekerk (see note 65 above) 58.
79 1bid.
80 Kalis (see note 77 above).
81 The United States is the largest supplier of small arms and light weapons. F. Berrigan 'Big battles over
small arms: But progress at the United Nations is too slow' (2006) 15(2) African Security Review 116, 118.
82 Khulumani Support Group 'Brief Overview of the Khulumani Lawsuit'
http://www.khulumani.net/attachments/343 Khul umani%20Joi nt%20Press%20Statement%20-
%20Notice%200f%20Press%20Conference%203Sep09.pdf accessed on 3 September 2009.
83 The corporations and banks are from the following countries - Switzerland, Germany, The Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, France, and United States of America.
84 Khulumani Support Group 'Brief Overview of the Khulumani Lawsuit' (see note 82 above).
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the way for the lawsuit to proceed. Importantly, the impact of this matter is that it will set
precedent to the international community not to aid or assist regimes that are violating
human rights.
The most disturbing fact is that children are mainly recruited into armed forces because
countries can.85 Governmental unwillingness and inability to curb the recruitment of child
soldiers is a major reason why armed forces recruit children. As argued by Ayissi,86
compliance with the established norms remains essentially a dream. Although
governments have established minimum recruitment ages,87 at times, these legal
restrictions are disobeyed at will and government forces when desperate to 'refill' their
fighting forces, give way to the temptation of recruiting children into their forces. Also the
poor record keeping and lack of birth registration systems throughout the continent
contributes to the problem by allowing children well below the minimum age to be
recruited. 88
As highlighted in part 1.1, the fact that international treaties have not addressed the issue of
cross-border recruitment has caused this problem to escalate because the existing
international law provisions are difficult to apply in such situations. This makes it difficult
to protect children from cross-border recruitment and to apply enforcement and monitoring
mechanisms. Although concerns have risen about the practice, not much can be done for
children in these situations, because this aspect has been overlooked by international law.
Thus, countries like the DRC, Uganda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continue to engage in this
practice since legally, not much can be done about it.
Although it is not a cause for the recruitment of child soldiers, national service, in the case
of a tension or strife breaking out, creates the opportunity for children to be recruited.
National service is a compulsory service in the military during peacetime.89 Compulsory
military service is more often known as conscription, and the Rome Statute criminalizes
conscription or enlisting children under 15 (whether this is forced or voluntary) into armed
85 Singh (note 3 above) 212.
86 A. Ayissi 'Protecting children in armed conflict: from commitment to compliance' (2002) 3 Children and
Security 5, 5.
87 (see note 57 above).
88 Kalis (see note 77 above).
89 D.R. Gurnell 'Briewe - 'Community service - or conscription" (2003) 93(2) South African Medical
Journal 84, 84.
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forces or groups.90 Although with national service, conscription is present in the form of
compulsory military service, it is not into armed forces or hostilities. However, the
national service programs should be viewed sceptically because this can be referred to as
'recruitment potential,.91 This is due to the fact that if a conflict were to arise, this aspect
will expose these children to being recruited into armed forces. For example, in
Zimbabwe, the National Youth Service92 has been used by the ZANU PF for their political
agenda. Thus, national service programs can serve as a 'breeding ground' for recruitment
of children during inter- or intra- State conflicts.
90 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute states that: '(2) For the purpose of this Statute, 'war crimes'
means: (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within
the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: (xxvi) Conscripting or
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate
actively in hostilities'.
91 A. McIntyre, 'African children in armed conflict: bridging right and reality' (2003) 1(2) Commonwealth
Youth and Development 5, 15.
92 It is a programme by the Zimbabwean government for Zimbabweans for the youths.
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHILD SOLDIERS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The recruitment of child soldiers is expressly prohibited by various international treaties
under international human rights law, humanitarian law, criminal law and even labour
law.93 Despite these various international treaties regulating the practice, there is
incontrovertible evidence that the problem is continuing on a large scale and new
challenges keep emerging.94 This chapter contains a critically analysis of the effectiveness
of international law on the protection of children against recruitment in armed forces from
the perspective of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, with focus on Africa. The
focus will therefore be on enforcement and monitoring mechanisms of the international
treaties prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers, especially in Africa. This critical
analysis will provide a good basis for understanding 'loopholes', vagueness and
inconsistencies in the treaties and the strengths and weaknesses of the enforcement and
monitoring mechanisms, which have the potential of creating legal uncertainty and
ultimately resulting in further injustice for the child.
Firstly, the researcher begins by discussing the legal framework for the protection of
children against recruitment into armed forces. The relevant international treaties are
discussed under the following categories: international humanitarian law, international
human rights law, international criminal law and international labour law. Secondly, the
researcher will analyse the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms embodied in these
relevant international treaties. Thirdly, the researcher will critically analyse the limitations
of the law relating to the protection of children against recruitment into armed forces.
In conclusion it is argued that the legal uncertainty is not per se the cause of recruitment
continuing; the cause being more complex than 'loopholes', vagueness and inconsistencies
in the treaties. Another reason why recruitment has continued is because, even though
member States are incorporating the international law into municipal law, they are not
being enforced; there is no political willingness to enforce these laws.95 Furthermore,
93 Article 38(2) of the AP-I, article 4(3)(c) of the AP-II, article 22(2) of the African Charter, article 38(2) of
the CRC, article 1 of the ILO Convention 182, article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC and article
8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute.
94 For example, the issue of cross-border recruitment.
95 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209.
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although some of the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have generated positive
outcomes; overall, most of them are too 'weak' and this has lead to the further prejudice for
the child.
2.2 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
RECRUITMENT INTO ARMED FORCES
2.2.1 International humanitarian law
International humanitarian law (IHL) is that branch of international law which governs
situations of armed conflict,96 IHL is the lex specialis,97 which only applies in situations of
armed conflict,98 IHL has its origins in either international customary law or treaty law,
and it is established with the intention of solving the humanitarian issues which rose
directly from either international or non-international armed conflicts.99 The role of IHL is
to offer protection to persons and to property which maybe affected by armed conflict.
loo
IHL is therefore the body of law which inter alia regulates the law pertaining to child
soldiers. lol Thus, the goal of IHL is to limit the consequences of war on people and
property and to protect particularly vulnerable persons. 102 The main IHL treaties are the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols. 103 The Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols embody mainly the significant rules limiting
the barbarity of war. 104
96 K. Bell & D. Abrahams 'The use of child soldiers in armed conflict' (2008) Obiter 162, 170.
97 The doctrine states that a law governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides a law which only
governs general matters (lex generalis).
98 D.R. Mekonnen & J.L. Pretorius 'Prosecuting the main perpetrators of international crimes in Eritrea :
possibilities under international law' (2008) 33(2) Journalfor Juridical Science 76,81 fn2l.
99 F. Ang 'Article 38 Children in armed confli~t: A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child' (2005) 1, 10.
100 International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 'International Humanitarian Law (IHL)'
http://www.icrc.org(Eng(ihl accessed on 20 August 2009.
101 The two Additional Protocols were the first global treaties to deal with the issue of child soldiers.
102 Hrea.og 'International humanitarian law' http://www.hrea.org(index.php?doc id=415 accessed 31 July
2009.
103 1949 Geneva Convention I Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field. Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 31 hereafter Geneva Convention (1),1949 Geneva Convention
11 Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.
Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 85 hereafter Geneva Convention (11), 1949 Geneva Convention III
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 135 hereafter Geneva
Convention (Ill) and 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War. Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 287 (1949) hereafter Geneva Convention (IV).
104 International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 'International Humanitarian Law (IHL)' (see note 100
above).
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A number of provisions are included in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two
Additional Protocols of 1977 with a view of safeguarding the rights of children.
los
The two
Additional Protocols referred to above were the first global treaties to deal with the issue of
child soldiers; thus providing greater protection for children against the effects of hostilities
and for the first time regulating their participation in armed conflicts. 106 The two Protocols
establish 15 years as the minimum age for recruitment. l07 This standard has subsequently
been reiterated in article 38(2) CRC and article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute. By
virtue of the standard being reiterated in a number of treaties, it proves that it has been
accepted and recognized by the international community; thus making it customary
international law. 108 Since the standard has achieved the customary law status, the jus
cogens principle applies to the standard and in accordance with this principle, derogation
from the norm is not permitted. 109
However, in terms of jurisdiction, the AP-I is only applicable to international armed
conflicts; whereas the AP-II is only applicable to non-international armed conflicts. This
aspect is significant to Africa because many of the conflicts within the continent are
internal. There is no doubt that the internal nature of current armed conflicts has
significantly increased the possibility that children will be recruited into armed forces. 110
Furthermore, whereas the AP-I prohibits only the recruitment for direct hostilities, III article
4(3)(c) of the AP-II specifically prohibits recruitment for both direct or indirect hostilities.
Ironically, the rules pertaining to internal conflicts are far more stringent than the rules in
respect of international conflicts. I 12 This can be used as evidence to suggest that the States
participating in the Diplomatic Conference during the finalization of the treaty intended to
impose a stricter standard on parties involved in an internal armed conflict. I 13 Taking into
consideration the situation in Africa, this is a positive development. Unfortunately, this has
105 Article 3 of the Geneva Convention (I), article 3 of the Geneva Convention (n), article 3 of the Geneva
Convention (Ill), article 3 of the Geneva Convention (IV), article 77 of the AP-I and article 4(3) of the AP-Il.
106 A. Baker & H. Ben-Ari 'The Use o/Children in Armed Conflict' (2000) 26 Justice 7, 8.
107 Article 77(2) of the AP-I and article 4(3)(c) of the AP-Il.
108 Customary international law are those aspects of international law that derive from custom and are
applicable to every State. J. D. Muzuzi 'An analysis of the approach to the right to freedom from torture
adopted by the African Commission on Human Rights and People's Rights' (2006) 5(2) African Human
Rights Law Journal 423, 425.
109 Ibid.
110 A. Shepherd 'Child soldiers: Is the Optional Protocol to the CRC evidence of an emerging "straight-I 8"
consensus?' (2000) International Journal ol'Children 's Rights 37 37.
111 'J,
Article 77(2).
112 Singh (see note 3 above) 215.
113 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 201.
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not made any difference because in several countries in Africa the recruitment of child
Id ' . 114so lers IS on a rampage.
2.2.2 International human rights law
International human rights law represents the concept of fundamental rights, which
comprise civil, political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and other rights as
belonging to every individual by virtue of them being human. I IS Obligations are generally
laid down in international human rights treaties, which States are bound to respect. Thus,
by becoming a member State, States assume obligations and duties under IHRL to respect,
to protect and to fulfill human rights. The obligations to respect, protect and to fulfill
human rights require the States to abstain from interfering with or limiting the enjoyment
of human rights, to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses and to take
positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. 116 In this regard the
treaties that fall under international human rights law and are relevant to the current
discussion are: the CRC, Optional Protocol to the CRC and the African Charter.
Article 38(2) of the CRC states that 'States parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure
that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in
hostilities'. Thus, this article is inconsistent with the rest of the instrument in using a 15-
year age minimum because in all other respects, the CRC's general definition of a child is
any person under the age of 18. The CRC defines a child as any person 'below the age of
18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier'. 117 Then
later on in the document it provides 15 as the minimum age of recruitment for direct
hostilities. I 18 The article urges State parties 'to take all feasible measures' to ensure that
persons who have not attained the age of 15 years are not recruited into armed forces. 119
Thus, article 38(2) does not apply to all children and therefore does not offer all children
equal protection.
114 Singh (see note 3 above) 206.
115 Mekonnen & Pretorius (see note 98 above) 81 fn21.
116 le. Mubangizi 'The protection of human rights in South Africa: A legal and practical Guide' (2004) Juta,
2.
117 Article lofthe CRe.
118 Article 38(2) Ibid.
119It is derived from article 77(2) of the AP-1. Y. Dinstein 'The Conduct of Hostilities under Law of
International Armed Conflict' (2004) Cambridge University Press, 141.
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Remarkably, the Optional Protocol to the CRC raises the minimum age of recruitment from
15 to 18.120 Member States are obliged to take 'all feasible measures' to ensure that under-
18s are not recruited into armed forces. 12I It has, nevertheless, retained 15 years as the
minimum age of voluntary enlistment. In Article 3(3) allows for voluntary recruitment by
government, but article 4(1) prohibits non-government armed forces from recruiting under-
18s. It is clear that the Optional Protocol to the CRC provides a double standard as it
provides different standards for armed forces to a Member State and non-State armed
forces. 123 It is most probable that non-State armed forces will not feel obliged to abide by a
standard which is different from that imposed on the State.
The African Charter creates a more stringent protection against recruitment of African
children, as compared to the global treaties that prohibit the recruitment of children into
armed forces. I24 The Charter is the only treaty at a regional level dealing with the issue of
child soldiering and children in armed conflict. The Charter does not make the distinction
between people younger than 18 years and those younger than 15 years. 125 Unlike the
CRC, it adopts a 'straight 18' position, which is compliant with the overall definition of a
child. 126 In relation to the recruitment of child soldiers, the Charter, by adopting the
'straight 18' position, prohibits the recruitment ofunder-18s into armed forces. In addition,
under the Charter, State parties are obliged to take 'all necessary measures' to ensure that
no children take direct part in hostilities and to refrain from recruiting children into armed
forces. 127 Theoretically, this provisKm is supposed to send a clear message that the
recruitment of children into armed forces is unacceptable and will not be tolerated on the
continent. 128 Unfortunately, this is not the case because the recruitment of child soldiers
does happen.
120 Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the CRe.
121 Article 1 ibid..
122 Article 3(3) ibid.
123 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 176; Singh (see note 3 above) 217; Mezmur (see note llabove) 206-
7.
124 AP-I, AP-II, CRC, and the Rome Statute define a child as any person under the age of 15, and the other
treaties, with the exception of the Rome Statute, do not address both the issues of age and nature of hostilities.
125 Article 2 of the African Charter defines a child as 'every human being below the age of 18 years' for all
purposes of the Charter.
26 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 202.
127 Article 22(2).
128 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 202.
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The CRC and the African Charter should be applauded for their coordinative nature; in the
sense that the two treaties combine humanitarian law and human rights norms,129 and in
addition, the African Charter combines labour law and human rights norms.
l3O
Thus, State
parties to the treaties are obliged to adhere to their IHL, IHRL and labour law obligations.
The treaties furthermore give the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee)
and the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare to the Child (African Charter
Committee) the mandate to apply the norms contained in other treaties. 131 Article 46 of
the African Charter states that the Committee can draw its inspiration from other sources.
However, the CRC does not have a specific provision to this effect, but article 43(1) read
together with article 38(1) states that Committee must ensure that that State parties
undertake their obligations under the Convention; thus State parties are obliged to respect
and to ensure respect the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. Therefore, it can be argued that the
combination of humanitarian law, labour law and human rights norms will ensure that the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) and the Committee of Experts on
the Rights and Welfare to the Child (African Charter Committee) are able to address the
gaps that exist between law and practice by having the relevant treaties compliment each
other wherever necessary. 132
Article 41 of the CRC states that if any provisions contained in the law of a Member State
or international law in force for that State are more conducive to the realisation of the rights
of the child, the provisions have to take precedence over the CRC. The purpose of this
article is to guarantee that State parties provide the most favourable protection for the child
in accordance with their respective international obligations. 133 In the context of the CRC
and the African Charter, the Charter has a higher standard as compared to the CRC. 134 In
light of this, the provisions of the Charter should take precedence over the CRC. The
Charter offers better protection by adopting the 'straight 18" position and by requiring a
129 Article 38(1) of the CRC and article 22(1) of the African Charter.
130 Article 15 of the African Charter.
131 Article 43(1) of the CRC and article 46 of the African Charter.
132 1bid.
133 Ang (see note 99 above) 64.
134 B.D. Mezmur, 'The African Children's Charter versus the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: a
zero-sum game? ' (2008) 23(1) SA Publiekreg = SA Public Law 1, 14.
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lower degree of intensity for its application; as it applies to riots, isolated and sporadic acts
of violence, which have not yet reached the level of internal armed conflicts.
135
The adoption of the African Charter is in tandem with the United Nations' recognition of
regional arrangements for the protection of human rights. 136 As highlighted above, in
harmonising laws, State parties to the African Charter have an obligation to adhere to the
higher normative standards that the African Charter offers over the CRC. 137 However, for
human rights to be successfully implemented there ought to be a meaningful interplay
between international human rights standards and municipal law. 138 The relationship
between international law and municipal law is by no means clear-cut. There are those
who believe that the two constitute distinct branches of law which never overlap (dualist
theory).139 Accordingly, the enforcement of international human rights into municipal law
becomes problematic. Thus, although-the Charter compositely addresses both the issues of
age and nature of hostilities that appear to confound other treaties; 140 in practice, due to the
relationship between international treaties and municipal law, the provisions of the Charter
are not taking precedence. Some State parties, to both the CRC and the African Charter,
hide themselves behind the lower international standards. 141
There is incontrovertible evidence that the problem of child recruitment into armed forces
is continuing on a large scale and new challenges keep emerging. 142 The research will
focus on the issue of child cross-border recruitment which has become wide spread in
Africa. 143 Cross-border recruitment arises whenever there is a conflict occurring in a
different country within a region, and children are recruited from the territory of another
country.144 The Optional Protocol to the CRC in paragraph 11 of its preamble condemns
135 Article 22(3) ofthe African Charter. _
136Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights were sanctioned by UN General
Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/125.
137 Article 41 of the CRe.
138 Mubangizi (see note 116 above) 32.
139 Ibid.
140 CRC in relation to recruitment for direct hostilities defines a child as any person under the age of 15, and
the other treaties and it does not address both the issues of age and nature of hostilities.
141 For example, Burundi (16), Angola & Sudan (17), Sierra Leone (17.5), the DRC & Somalia have no legal
limitation on child recruitment. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 'Africa Report' 2001 (see note 57
above).
142 For example, the issue of cross-border recruitment.
143 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209.
144 Ibid.
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child cross-border recruitment. 145 Similarly, the Palermo Protocol in article 3(c) also
prohibits child cross border recruitm;nt. The Palermo Protocol prohibits 'trafficking in
persons', and the recruitment of children into armed forces falls under the ambit of
'trafficking in person' .146 Thus, this creates a wider ambit for the protection of children
from being recruited into armed forces since trafficking laws apply in relation to child
cross-border recruitment.
The anti-trafficking conventions have contributed to the protection of children being
recruited into armed forces by adding additional mechanisms to protect children from
cross-border recruitment. 147 Under the UN anti-trafficking mechanisms, the Office of the
Special Representative for Combating the Traffic of Human Beings has been established; 148
and the actions against human trafficking are carried out by the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) under the coordination of the Office of the Special
Representative. 149 OSCE has established an anti-trafficking mechanism aimed at raising
public awareness of the problem of child cross-border recruitment and building the political
will within participating States to tacRle it effectively. It is unfortunate; considering that
the practice is wide spread in Africa, that the continent does not have a similar body similar
to the OSCE. However, the anti-trafficking mechanism is not superior to the other
enforcement mechanisms discussed above; as much as the enforcement mechanism has
brought awareness of the problem, no change has been yielded. 150 This aspect is shown by
the fact that the issue of child cross-border recruitment in Africa has become wide
spread. 151 As will be highlighted in part 2.4, although the two treaties mentioned above are
the only international treaties that mention child recruitment across borders they are both of
limited use in addressing the issue. 152
2.2.3 International criminal law
145 Paragraph 11 of the Preamble provides 'condemning with the gravest concern the recruitment, training,
and use within and across national border children in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the armed
forces of a State... '.
146 Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol ibid &liefenbrum (see note 2 above) 415.
147 The Optional Protocol to the CRC and Palermo Protocol.
148 UN, Improving the coordination ofefforts against trafficking in persons (2008) N63/90.
149 Ibid.
150 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209, Sloth-Nielsen (see note 33 above) 59 and Security Council, Report of
the Secretary General: DRC (2007) N62/609-SI20071757.
151 Ibid.
152 Mezmur (note 11 above) 208.
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Child soldiers have also found protection within the discourse of international criminal
law. 153 International criminal law deals with the most serious crimes of international
concern. 154 Under international criminal law, the recruitment of children under the age 15
years is considered a 'war crime'. 155 The Rome Statute criminalizes conscription or
enlisting of children under the age of 15 years (whether this is forced or voluntary) into
armed forces or groups.156 Although the Rome Statute uses the terminology of
'conscription' or 'enlistment' of under-ISs, this is accepted as meaning the same as
'recruitment' in the other treaties that prohibit the practice. 157 This prohibition applies to
both the government armies and rebel groups. It provides that such an act during an
internal armed conflict is a war crime. 158 This aspect is significant in Africa because many
of the conflicts within the continent are internal. The Rome Statute established the
International Criminal Court (ICC) which has the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
any person guilty of committing an act that is considered a war crime under the
instrument. 159 The Rome Statute imposes penal sanctions upon offenders to this Statute,160
thereby imposing necessary sanctions upon offenders and increasing the protection
afforded to child soldiers. 161
2.2.4 International labour law
International labour law is the body of legal rules concerning labour law that apply between
sovereign States and entities that have been granted international personality by sovereign
States. 162 Child soldiers have also found protection within the discourse of international
law on child labour. 163 Children recruited as combatants fit the definition of 'child
labour' .164 The term 'child labour' is defined as 'work by children under 18 which is
exploitative, hazardous or otherwise inappropriate for their age, detrimental to their
153 The Rome Statute.
154 The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
155 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute.
156 Ibid.
157 Human Rights Watch Children's' Rights 'Child Soldiers' (note 34 above).
158 Article 8(2)(e)(vii). -
159 Article 1.
160 Article 77.
161 Bell & Abraham (see note 96 above) 179.
::: 1. Dugard International law: a South African perspective (2005) Juta, 329.
ILO Convention 182.
164 R. Stohl 'Children soldiering is the worst form of child labour' Centre for Defense Information (2000)
http://www.cdi.org accessed 1 October 2009.
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schooling, or social, physical, mental, spiritual or moral development' .165 The international
community has argued that in order for children to enjoy their basic human rights, the life-
threatening labor practices, including the use of child soldiers, must be eliminated.
166
The
ILO Convention 182 has banned the worst forms of child labor.
167
Article 3(a) of the ILO
-
Convention 182 in its definition of the worst forms of child labour includes 'forced and
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed forces'. It obligates State parties to
take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of forced
and compulsory recruitment. 168
Although this is a positive step, looking at the Convention's language it appears that
children who are voluntary recruits will not be protected by the Convention, since the
Convention only deals with forced and compulsory recruitment. 169 For example, the only
children that will be protected by the Convention are those involved in forced abductions,
such as those used by the rebel groups. For example, those used by the rebel groups from
Uganda and Sierra Leone, namely, the LRA and Revolutionary United Front (RUF).170
Therefore, those children who are involved in 'voluntary' recruitment are not
accommodated for in the treaty. Children who volunteer to join-up should have been
accommodated by the treaty since the definition of 'child labour' does not distinguish
between 'voluntary' or 'forced' or 'compulsory' child labour. In relation to trafficking,
inter alia, the Palermo Protocol states that the consent of children is immaterial. 171 The
definition simply identifies conduct that has to be regarded as child labour and recruitment
of children into armed forces; whether voluntary or forced or compulsory, fits the
definition of 'child labour'. Considering that participation is often a response to pressure of
more subtle nature, 172 the treaty should not have made such a distinction.
2.2.5 Conclusion
165 N. Duncan & B. Bowman 'Educational aspirations, child labour imperatives and structural inequality in
the South African agricultural sector: Research Article' (2008) 26(3) Perspectives in Education 29 30
166 ' .
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167 Article 1.
168 Ibid.
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In conclusion it can be argued that the recruitment of child soldiers is expressly prohibited
by various international treaties under international human rights law, humanitarian law,
criminal law and even labour law. Theoretically, the legal framework for the protection of
children against recruitment into armed forces is supposed to send a clear message that the
recruitment of children into armed forces is unacceptable and will not be tolerated on the
continent. However, this is not the case because in several countries in Africa the
recruitment of child soldiers is on a rampage. There is irrefutable evidence that the
problem of child recruitment into armed forces is continuing on a large scale and new
challenges keep emerging. As will be highlighted below, the weakness in enforcing and
monitoring international law might have a role in the continuation of child recruitment.
2.3 ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING MECHANISMS OF THE RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
2.3.1 Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms
(i) UN Mechanisms
In order to have a sound knowledge of the fate of children in armed conflict and to be more
effective in combating this problem, the UN requested the Secretary General to appoint an
expert to undertake a comprehensive study on the impact of armed conflict on children. 173
In response to this, the Secretary General appointed Graca Machel for this mission. In her
report, one of her key recommendations was the appointment of a Special Representative
for Children and Armed Conflict. 174 The fact that the problem of child soldiers has
received attention at UN level illustrates how serious the problem is. It is unfortunate that
considering that the practice is on a rampage in Africa, such attention is not replicated at
African level. The reason for this is that many African States engage in the practice. 175
The role of the Office of the Special Representative is mainly to advocate for the protection
of children affected by armed conflict. Field visits have been a central element of her
173 Ayissi (see note 86 above) 7.
174 In September 1999, the Secretary-General of the UN appointed Mr. Olara A. Otunnu as his Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy has assumed this position
since April 2006 through the UN General Assembly Resolution AiRES/51/77 (1997).
175 Musila (see note 6 above) 332.
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advocacy strategy to bring high-level visibility to the situation and rights of children
affected by armed conflict. 176 Such visits enable the Special Representative to bear witness
first-hand to the situation of children, to increase dialogue with member States, to support
more effectively the work of operational partners, to obtain commitments from parties to
conflict and to unblock difficult political situations, as required. 177
Thus far, these collaborative efforts between the UN entities and their partners have
resulted in significant advances, actions and tangible results for children.
l78
The
collaborative efforts include working together to: systematically engage with member
States, foster discussions to advance the agenda on how to combat the practice of child
soldiers, advocate at critical moments in the development of the agenda, and to ensure
clarity on division of labour on an issue that cuts across the mandates and responsibilities
of multiple actors in the UN system. 179 Although collaborations are generally a good idea,
at times it can mean that the campaigns move slowly because of the need to get consensus
or check with other players regarding every decision. 18o However, on one hand, advocacy
campaigns have been effective in part because they have taken the discourse on child and
youth involvement in conflict out of the political and military context and placed it into one
circumscribed by legal and moral concern. 181 On the other hand, they have been less
effective in bringing about change because, as will be highlighted below in part 3, III
several African countries the recruitment of child soldiers is on a rampage.
Among the main organs of the UN is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which
has the mandate to maintain international peace and security. Its powers are outlined in the
UN Charter, I82 and they are exercised through UN Security Council Resolutions. The
176 Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict 'Field visits'
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/countryvisits.htmlaccesssed on 29 June 2009.
177 Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict 'Advocacy'
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/countryvisits.htmlaccesssed on 29 June 2009.
178 Increased global awareness of the issues concerning children affected by armed conflict; development and
strengthening of international norms and standards for the protection of children; consistent focus and
prioritization of this issue by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council; placing children and
armed conflict on the international peace and security agenda through systematic engagement of the Security
Council; and deeper mainstreaming of children and armed conflict in the United Nations system and
concerted advocacy. [bid.
179 Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict "Working with partners'
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/workingwithpartners.html accessed on 29 June 2009.
180/bid.
181 McIntyre (see note 91 above) 10.
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UNSC has passed a number of Resolutions condemning the recruitment of child soldiers.
I83
Importantly, Resolution 1612 (2005) calls for a series of measures to be taken, including
the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring and reporting violations.
I84
Under these
new mechanisms, UN-led task forces are established in phases, to monitor the conduct of
all parties and transmit regular reports to a central task force in New York. 185 Through the
established UN-led task forces, signs of some success are visible. For example, in the
DRC, significant progress has been made by the government through the implementation of
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for children;186 to ensure
that children are not recruited into armed forces in pursuant to the conclusions and
recommendations of the UN-led task forces. 187 The army has also changed its integration
process, which has lead to the decrease in the number of active fighting zones.
188
A concrete follow up of the recommendation in UN Resolution 1261 that the welfare of
children should be promoted throughout the peace process, was the appointment of the first
Child Protection Adviser (CPA) attached to the Peace Keeping Operation in Sierra Leone
in 2000, and thereafter in the DRC and Angola. 189 A CPA forms part of the central staffof
the heads of the UN field missions, serving as their direct adviser on the protection of
children. 19o This means that the CPA makes it a point that children are demobilised and are
not recruited or re-recruited into armed forces. The CPA helps to ensure that the protection
of children's rights is priority concerns right through the peace-keeping process.
The UNSC has the power to apply sanctions in respect of the perpetrators, in a bid to try
and stop them from violating children's rights. Economic sanctions are restrictions upon
international trade and finance that one country or countries impose on another country or
183 Resolution 1314 sets out, inter alia, specific action oriented measures such as tackling the illicit trade in
conflict diamonds, ending impunity for war crimes against children. Resolution 1349 strengthens the
measures provided for in Resolution 1314, and makes them more targeted. Resolution 1460 broadens the
scope for monitoring and reporting, stipulating that all country-specific reports should include sections for
children, and endorses an era of application. Resolution 1612 calls for a series of measures to be taken,
including the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring and reporting violations.
184 Article 2 of the UNSC Resolution 1612.
185 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209.
186 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General: DRC (2007) UN
Document A/62/609-SI2007/757.
187 Amnesty International 'DRC: Children at war, creating hope for the future'
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sidlYAOI-6UG58J?OpenDocument accessed on 12 June 2009.
\88 I bid.
189 R. Harvey 'Section 1: Overview of international law and developments' in Children and Armed Conflict:
A guide to international humanitarian law and human rights 5, 16.
1901bid.
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certain individuals for political reasons. 191 Thus far the UNSC has imposed a travel ban
and froze the assets of Martin Kouakou Fofie, a commander of the Forces Nourvelles in
Cote d'Ivoire, and expanded existing ~anctions (including travel bans and asset freezes) to
apply to individual child recruiters in the DRC.
I92
As will be shown in part 3, the
continuous recruitment is an indication of the failure of this mechanism.
At times the economical sanctions are imposed on a country as a whole, and this may
sometimes have the greatest adverse effects on innocent families. 193 The unfortunate part
is that in most African countries when sanctions are imposed, the countries are already in
severe humanitarian crisis, and the sanctions have no exemptions to humanitarian
supplies. 194 For example, in Burundi; although the sanctions were not applied per se
because Burundi was recruiting child soldiers, the sanctions which were initially imposed
where without exemptions for humanitarian supplies; and this affected the health and
welfare of civilians, especially the children. 195
Notably, the AD has an equivalent body to the UNSC - the Peace and Security Council of
the AD. Its primary mandate is conflict prevention, management and resolution. 196 Thus,
if the body is sufficiently utilized it will play a vital role in the prevention of the
recruitment of child soldiers. It is the first body under international law to deal with
preventative measures. The UNSC and international law deal with protection rather than
prevention. Therefore, the body, through its mandate of conflict prevention can; instead of
waiting for the problem of child soldiers to arise, establish preventative measures to avoid
conflicts. This can mostly be done through arbitration. The researcher submits that since
the body's primary mandate is conflict resolution, management and resolution, in relation
to the issue of child soldiers the functions and the duties of the body are to prevent
recruitment of child soldiers. Thus far, it is still proliferation on paper, rather than actual
progress; 197 with financial issues hampering on the progress of the body.198
191 HJ.G. Zandman 'Economic sanctions: An ethical primer' (2008) 42(3) In die Skriflig 531,533-4.
192 Human Rights Watch 'UN: Security Council must punish users of child soldiers'
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/27 accessed on 7 February 2009.
193 Zandman (see note 191 above) 532-3. -
194 E. Hoskins & S. Nutt 'The humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Burundi'
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/OP29.pdf accessed 1 October 2009.
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196 Protocol Relating To The Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002).
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However, neither the above bodies nor the international community can 'assist' children
whilst the conflict is still on-going. It is unfortunate that when parties to a conflict violate
international law, there is little action that can be taken by the international community to
enforce compliance while the conflict is on_going. 199 For example, during the Rwandan
genocide in 1994, the international-community let itself be a mere 'eyewitness' or
'bystander' .200 Commonly, prosecutions for violation of international law are only effected
following the cessation of hostilities and the signing of a peace agreement.
20
! This means
that the international community is unable to protect children during armed conflict, thus in
a way leaving them vulnerable to recruitment.202 Even when the international community
seeks prosecution after the end of the conflicts, this does not always ensure that justice is
obtained. Often victors avoid prosecutions through amnesties agreed upon to bring an end
to a conflict and allow those culpable to escape punishment. For example, in Nigeria,
hundreds of rebel fighters gave up their weapons and accepted an amnesty dea1.
203
However, some countries do not offer amnesty deals to rebels. For example, the DRC
government has detained the rebel leader, Laurent Nkunda. 204
The UNSC can authorise a 'humanitarian intervention' by the international community
whilst the conflict is still on-going. Holzgrefe defines the term 'humanitarian intervention'
as
'the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of States) aimed at preventing or
ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its
own citizens, without the permission of the State within whose territory force is applied' .205
In the case of the prevention of the recruitment of child soldiers, humanitarian intervention
will be quite significant.206 To some extent this will reduce the number of children being
198 J. Cilliers & K. Sturman 'Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council' (2004) 13(1) African
Security Review 97, 97.
199 Harvey (see note 189 above) 18.
200 W. De Beer 'When to intervene to save lives: International law' (2008) 8(3) Without Prejudice 60,60.
201 This is when the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
where established.
202 UNICEF 'Special concerns' http://www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm accessed 31 October 2009.
203 Reteurs AlertNet 'Nigerian rebel leaders give up arms in amnesty deal'
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L3428248.htm accessed 31 October 2009.
204 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General: DRC (2007) A/62/609-
S/2007/757.
205 J.L. Holzgrefe & R.O. Kedane Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and political dilemma (2003),
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recruited into armed forces. Consequently, only a few interventions have provided a
significant benefit. 207 For example, the 1999 NATO bombings in Kosovo and Serbia
brought to a halt the ethnic cleansing and other clear violations of the Rome Statute; which
prevented an escalation of atrocities and produced a positive result.
208
In Africa, there has
been a lack of political will to support such interventions;209 in the sense that the States that
have intervened in order to provide humanitarian aid are not offered any assistance by the
local government. Thus, children are still recruited and re-recruited into armed forces.
The intemationallaw currently in force contains no direct measure to intervene. The closest
measure allowing for direct humanitarian intervention is Article 4(h) of the Constitutive
Act of the African Union where intervention is allowed by the Peace and Security Council
pursuant to a decision of the assembly.21o The UN Charter, similarly, allows for action of
many different forms in Chapters VII and VIII, but no specific provision for humanitarian
intervention is made. Consequently, the lack of strict, direct and easily interpreted
requirements have resulted in catastrophes. For example, the lack of humanitarian
intervention in Rwanda was a contributing factor to the ultimate consequence; the death of
approximately 800 000 people.211 Furthermore, this aspect has also resulted to the failure
of humanitarian interventions. For example, the humanitarian intervention in Somalia
resulted in a failed intervention because of its mismanagement; the US became entangled in
local politics.212
The UN can also deploy peacekeepers to post-conflict situations to offer protection for the
populations under threat and to safeguard their rights?l3 The peacekeepers play an
essential role in preventing armed forces from recruiting or re-recruiting child soldiers,
since even during the post-conflict situation fighting might still be occurring. The irony is
that in some situations peacekeepers themselves violate human rights.214
206 United Nations Association of Australian (Victorian Division) 'Humanitarian Intervention- Responsibility
to Protect: Position Paper - The Republic of Liberia' RMIT University Model UN Conference 2006.
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208 Ibid.
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It is unfortunate that the UN reacts 'at a snail's pace' to crucial matters. An example of
their slowness is the situation in Liberia. The UN Peace Keeping Mission was aware of the
problem of the recruitment of child soldiers and indicated that they were actively
monitoring the situation on Liberia's border, and yet recruitment persisted.
2ls
The reason
why the UN peacekeepers were stationed on the borders of Liberia was because there was
an already established regional peacekeeping effort within the borders of Liberia; the
Economic Community of West Africa Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)?16
However, considering the intensity of the situation, the UN should have worked in
collaboration with the regional team within the borders of Liberia because there was not
much they could do stationed on the borders of Liberia.
As was highlighted in part 1.6, technology developments and the proliferation of light,
inexpensive weapons in many African countries in recent years has greatly contributed to
the recruitment of child soldiers. In particular, small arms transfer is a major contributor to
the problem of child soldiers in Africa. Although some agreements, such as the Maputo
Declaration on Child Soldiers and the UN Resolution 1261, explicitly call for an end to
small arms transfers to States that recruit child soldiers, many signatory and non-signatory
nations do not comply with the tenets.217 These nations, due to superseding economic and
political interests, continue small arms transfers through private deals on the black
market,218
In response to this, the UN has initiated the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (pOA).219 The
Programme contains a number of measures at national, regional and global levels, in the
areas of legislation and destruction ~f small arms and light weapons that have been
confiscated, seized, or collected in individual UN member States.220 POA also includes
215 Singh (see note 3 above) 212.
216 A. Adebajo Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa (2002) Boudler,
Colo: Lynne Reinner Publishers 107-8.
217 Kalis (see note 77 above).
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219 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons 2001 UN Doc NCONF.192/15 (2001) hereafter POA.
220 I. Ndungu 'Measuring the impact of arms control agreements in Africa: National reports on the United
Nations programme of action on small arms and light weapons in Africa' (2008) 1(4) Arms Control: Africa 9,
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international cooperation and assistance efforts to be undertaken in strengthening the ability
of member States in identifying and tracing illicit small arms and light weapons?21 In
order to assess the degree of implementation of POA, the member States are obliged to
provide national reports to an independent and impartial Registry of International Arms
Transfers on their efforts.222 Research done by Ndungu223 indicates an inconsistency in
reporting, and sadly, the countries that have significant challenges in the proliferation of
illicit arms rarely make their submissions.224 This reporting mechanism is very weak on
the basis of the pattern of reporting, due to its voluntary nature and the fact that POA does
not specify how frequently States should make their submissions.225 Thus, due to these
aspects it will be very difficult to curb the problem of small arms and light weapons.
As a response to the threat of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, the Economic
Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) adopted a Convention on small arms and light
weapons in 2006.226 The Convention is an extensive instrument that seeks to address
several key elements of POA?27 Just-as with POA, the monitoring of the Convention is
through reports from the member States. The Convention has suffered the same fate as
POA because the reporting mechanism is very weak. The reporting on such matters in
Africa is very limited.228 Furthermore, there is an irregular implementation of regional
agreements which leaves loopholes that arms traffickers can exploit.229 Despite the
challenges, Alusala argues that the Convention is a move in a positive direction.23o
(ii) International humanitarian law
Children in war zones are excellent targets for recruitment into armed forces. In light of
this, inter alia, article 14 of the Fourth Geneva Convention231 and article 78 of the AP-II
221 Ibid.
222 Para. 11.33 of the POA.
223 Ndungu (see note 220 above).
224 For example, the DRC.
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require State parties to remove children from a war zone to a place of safety.232
Unfortunately, there is no adherence to this rule, and these children are seen as easy targets
for recruitment.233 The task of removing children from war zones becomes even more
complex because the children have nowhere else to go. Also at times the government is too
focused on the war that it 'ignores' this obligation. However, some countries have adhered
to this rule and have been able to some extent to protect children from recruitment into
armed forces. For example, Uganda has created Internally Displaced Camps, called
'protected villages' which are protected by the local militias.234
Nonetheless, in times of conflict, the difficulties facing these States are not just internal.
235
The regional and defense organisations capable of helping the States at war can only come
to their aid when the situation has neutralized.236 This means that during the time when the
conflict is at its 'prime' the States are in 'isolation'. There are however instances where
State parties have actually taken up children from countries that are in armed conflict when
they present themselves at their 'doorstep' .237 Furthermore, in a bid to protect these
children, international treaties require international collaboration in respect to children who
are seeking refugee status or who are considered refugees.238 Regrettably, there are also
instances where State parties have ta~en advantage of these children and have deployed
them into their armed forces. 239
Although the two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were the first
international treaties to address the protection of child soldiers specifically, they do not
establish any monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.24o It can be argued therefore that
the two Protocols are futile as far as the protection of child soldiers is concerned because
they have not established any measures of implementation or supervision to ensure
232 The children can be moved to a neutral country.
233 Singh (see note 3 above) 209 fn9.
234 K. A. Apuuli, 'Amnesty and International Law: the case of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgents in
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compliance with their provisions. On the other hand, as will be illustrated further on,
although most of the treaties have monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, the provisions
of the treaties are not complied with by the member States. Although the fact that the lack
of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms is a major setback cannot be dismissed; in
relation to treaties that have embodied monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, it can be
argued that the problem is more complex than the issue of the establishment of
implementation and supervision provi.sions. Thus, it can be presumed the reason for the
continuation of the recruitment of child soldiers is caused by the ineffectiveness of the
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
(iii) International human rights law
The enforcement of the international law provisions relating to the recruitment of children
lies firstly with the member States of the relevant international treaties. However, as
highlighted above in part 2.2.2, the relationship between international law and municipal
law is by no means clear-cut. For human rights to be successfully implemented there ought
to be a meaningful interplay between international human rights standards and municipal
law.241 In respect to this aspect, there are two schools of thought in the respect; the dualist
and the monist. Under the dualist approach, treaties are part of a separate legal system
from that of municipal law.242 Thus, the treaty only becomes applicable when national
legislation has been enacted to give the treaty the force of law domestically?43 On the
contrary, under the monist approach,- treaties which are ratified by a State are directly
applicable in that State.244
However, the mere enactment of these laws into municipal law does not always provide for
their effective enforcement. Some African States have drafted national legislation, but
have failed to implement it. 245 The reluctance or failure of African governments to initiate
measures that will help curb the problem is a major factor that encourages the recruitment
of child soldiers.246 Although member States have international obligations and national




245 For example, some of the governments of these countries have laid down the minimum age for recruitment
but at times, these legal limitations are defied at will and government forces recruit under-aged children.
246 For example, in Sierra Leone, despite government promises and claims to the contrary, up to 30% of the
government-sponsored Citizens Defence Forces (CDF) in some areas are between 7 and 14 years of age.
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legislation which prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers, many African governments
resort to recruiting child soldiers during armed conflicts and might therefore be reluctant to
initiate measures to curb the problem. For example, the Uganda People's Defence Force
(UPDF) and the Local Defense Unit (LDU) during the civil war in Uganda recruited
children into their forces;247 and the Citizens Defence Forces (CDF) in Sierra Leone and
Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) in the DRC recruit
children into its forces. 248
Many of these laws have incorporated stipulations that diminish their effectiveness. For
example, despite the fact that Uganda-and Chad have laid down 18 years as the minimum
age for recruitment, these governments accept children who are younger than 18 with
parental consent to be recruited into army.249 In cases of prolonged internal conflict, as is
the case in some of the African States, the governments may simply not have the resources
or even the will to enforce these laws as they will be preoccupied with other
considerations.25o
It is important to note that during the negotiations of these treaties; which must be
implemented into the municipal law, promises are made and decisions are generally taken
by leaders meeting for a few days periodically, and usually eager to conclude the
deliberations as soon as possible and return home.251 Then the implementation of these
decisions is left for the international community, which is unable to achieve this without
the appropriate means and resources from the authors of these promises.252 Thus, even
though during the negotiations of treaties, States have committed to prevent the recruitment
of child soldiers, this has not transpire~ due lack of commitment. For example, the African
Charter Committee has not been able to function adequately due to lack of appropriate
means and resources from the State parties.253 This means that the Committee cannot
247 Human Rights Watch 'Uganda' http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403-
02.htm#TopOfPage accessed on 1 October 2009.
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address the issue of child soldiers without the appropriate means and resources for it to
function adequately.
As highlighted above in part 1.1, the main enforcement mechanism of both the CRC and
the Optional Protocol to the CRC is the 'reporting' system to the CRC Committee. The
major problem is that this enforcement mechanism is very weak/
54
and the seriousness
with which the States treat the reporting process varies widely.255 In addition, some of the
member States do not submit their reports on time; and at times they do not submit their
reports at all. Important to note is that particularly in Africa, although there have certainly
been developments,256 both the political willingness to adhere to already existing
obligations, as well as the readiness to think along new lines in terms of more effective
enforcement mechanisms, which are necessary prerequisites for improved enforcement are
lacking.257
In theory, the enforcement mechanisms in the African Charter are much stronger than those
found in the CRC.258 Not only do the enforcement mechanisms include the reporting
procedure, they also include individual complaints and investigations?59 These additional
enforcement mechanisms are beneficial to child soldiers because they present other means
by which the problem can be brought to the attention of the Committee. The reporting
system, as highlighted above in the cases of the CRC and the Optional Protocol to the
CRC, is a very weak enforcement mechanism. The latter mechanisms, although they are
found in the Charter, have been developed by the Committee by way of draft guidelines.26o
The respective draft guidelines were, inter alia, the Draft Guidelines for the Consideration
of Communications (Guidelines for Communications) and the Draft Guidelines for the
Conducting of Investigations (Guidelines for Investigations).261
254 Mezmur (note 11 above) 209.
255 [bid.
256 For example, there has been an improvement in relation to submitting reports by some State parties to the
African Charter. Mezmur (see note 134 above) 16.
257 Ibid.
258 Chirwa (see note 23 above) 169.
259 Article 43, article 44 & article 45.
260 The various guidelines were presented by the Committee members during the 8th session and were
subsequently adopted at the end of the meeting.
261 RD. Mezmur 'Still an infant or now a toddler? The work of the Mrican Committee of Experts on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child and its 8th ordinary session' (2007) 7 African Human Rights Law Journal
258,259.
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The Guidelines for Communications define 'communications' as 'any correspondence or
any compliant from a State, individual or NGO denouncing acts that are prejudicial to the
right or rights of the child. ,262 The African Charter Committee may admit a
communication from a State non-signatory to the Charter in the overall best interest of the
child?63 The Guidelines for Communications also addresses the issue of admissibility; 264
which was not dealt with previously in the Charter.265 Interestingly, the possibility for the
complaint requesting that the Committee reconsider its decision by providing additional
documents or facts is also provided for. 266 The Committee can consider provisional or
interim measures, the purpose of which is to avoid irreparable damage to victims or
complainants, during the course of the consideration of the communication?67 However,
the considerations of the communications are of a confidential nature; the communications
are considered in a session held in camera.268 Positively, the Guidelines embed one of the
four cardinal principles of the African Charter, namely 'child participation', into the
communication procedure?69 Furthermore, the Committee has established a follow-up
mechanism to its on communications, by designating one of its members to be responsible
for the monitoring of its decision.27o
In relation to 'investigations' the investigation missions can be initiated either by the
Committee or at the invitation of a member State.271 Article 14 deals with publicizing the
mission and inviting the public and all individuals likely to contribute to the mission's
success. At the end of the mission the mission delegation must to prepare two reports.
Firstly, the delegation, before leaving the country, must prepare a report presenting the
preliminary results of its investigation which is to be communicated to the government and
the media.272 Later the mission's final report must be prepared. The mission report is
expected to make recommendations.273 Positively, the Committee has also established
follow-up mechanisms in this regard. The Member State visited in the mission could be
262 Chapter 1, article 2(1) of the Guidelines for Communications.
263 Chapter 2, article I(II)(2) ibid.
264 Chapter 2, article 1(III)(b)-(c) ibid.
265 Mezmur (see note 261) 264.
266 Chapter 2, article 2(II)(3) of the Guidelines for Communications.
267 Chapter 2, article 2(IV)( 1) ibid. -
268 Chapter 3, article 1 ibid.
269 Chapter 3, article 3(3) ibid.
270 Chapter 3, article 4(1) ibid.
271 Article 4(1) & (2) ibid.
272 Article 12 ibid.
273 Article 23 ibid.
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requested, within six months after the mission or adoption of a decision by the Committee,
to present a written reply on any measures taken in light of the recommendations made in
the mission report?74 Civil society could also be requested to furnish information on the
.. h d 275SItuatIOn on t e groun .
Although, an individual complaint has not yet been brought before the Committee nor has
an investigation mission been carried out in relation to the recruitment of child soldiers;
these mechanism would be significant in addressing the problem of child soldiers. As
highlighted above, in respect of 'communications', the scope of individuals that can present
a communication before the Committee is quite wide.276 Furthermore, the Committee has
wide jurisdiction in respective of this mechanism because it is applicable to non-signatories
to the Charter provided it is in the overall best interest of the child??? The Committee
also has the power to issue provisional or interim measures; which will help to avoid
irreparable damage to victims or complainants, during the course of the consideration of
the communication.278 Interestingly, the complaint can request that the Committee
reconsider its decision by providing additional documents or facts. 279 More importantly,
the Committee has established a follow-up mechanism to both, communications and
investigation missions; which means that the Committee has the power to monitor its
decision. On the other hand, the cont}dentiality nature of communications can account to
the ineffectiveness of the Committee in the early years of its existence, just as it was with
the African Commission.28o The transparency of the Committee procedure will also not be
monitored if the confidentiality principle were strictly adhered to.
However, despite their potential contributions, the mechanisms seem to be drawing less
attention from the Committee.281 When it comes to communications, the Committee takes
long to consider them; and the longer it takes the more it allows the perpetuation of the
274 Article 26( I) ibid.
275 Article 27(2) ibid.
276 A communication may be presented by individuals, including the child victim and/or his parents or legal
representatives, a group of individuals or NGOs recognized by the OAD, by a member State or by any other
institution of the UN. Mezmur (see note 261 above) 262.
277 Chapter 2, article I(II)(2) ibid.
278 Chapter 2, article 2(IV)(l) of the Guidelines for Communications.
279 Chapter 2, article 2(II)(3) ibid.
280 Chirwa (see note 23 above) 170.
281 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 208.
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violation of children's rights. 282 For example, the Committee received a communication
that was prepared by the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria in 2005,
and it only appeared on the Committee agenda during the 13
th
session which was held in
2009?83 Consequently, at the end of the session, the communication had still not been
dealt with.284 The complaints mechanism is a powerful mechanism, if only the Committee
were prompt in their considerations?85 Furthermore, the Committee is reluctant in
initiating investigative missions that look into the problem of child soldiers,286 despite the
fact that the problem is on a rampage ~1 Africa.287 The failure of the Committee to initiate
the additional enforcement mechanisms can be attributed to the various problems it faces,
such as, financial problems, overdue reports and more recently, backlogs.
288
Besides, the African Charter, the African regional human rights system, created under the
auspices of the OAU/89 is also comprised of, inter alia, the Banjul Charter; which created
the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (African Commission).29o The
African Commission monitors compliance by member States with the Banjul Charter, inter
alia, in terms of their Rules of Procedure291 and in terms of the Reporting Guidelines for
State Reports.292 Furthermore, as part of its protective mandate, the Commission is
competent to entertain applications from individuals and NGOs alleging violations of the
Charter.293 However, the Commission has been criticised as being generally unable to 'act
as a forceful guardian of rights,.294 Naldi argues that a literal reading of the Charter
certainly suggests that the Commission possesses relatively weak powers of investigation
282 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (see note 22 above) 346.
283 [bid.
284 [bid.
285 The individual complaints give the Committee 'hands on' on the situation on the ground.
286 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 208.
287 Singh (see note 3 above) 206.
288 For example, during the second ordinary session of the African Charter Committee, 36 reports were
overdue. However, during the 10th ordinary session, there was some improvement because at least a few
reports were submitted. Unfortunately, during the 11 th and 12th ordinary sessions the problem was not with
the non-submissions of reports. The concern was that with a number of additional member State reports
already clamoring for attention, there is was a real danger that backlogs would arise.
289 Which has now been replaced by the African Union.
290 C. Heyns 'The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?' (2000) 1(2) African Human
Rights Law Journa1155, 155.
29\ Rules of Procedure ACHPR/RP/XIX.
292 Reporting Guidelines for State Reports AFR/COMlHPR.5(IV)
293 Articles 55-9 of the Banjul Charter and chp. XVII of the Rules of Procedure.
294 G.J. Naldi 'Interim measures of protection in the African system for the protection of human and peoples
rights' (2002) 2(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 1,3.
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and enforcement.295 Although the African Charter does not provide for interim measures,
rule III of the Rules of Procedure does. The purpose of interim measures is to avoid
irreversible damage being caused to the victim and/or to protect the interests of the parties
or to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings?96 Although the matters were not
linked to the issue of child soldiers, the Commission has indicated interim measures in a
number of cases.297 Unfortunately, Africa has often been criticised on account of its human
rights record, and the African Charter system in particular has been subjected to stringent
criticism due to its apparent inability to improve the situation.298
However, the creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (the African
Court) 299 with the specific task of re~forcing the role of the Commission would appear to
enhance in theory the prospects of promoting the protection of human rights in Africa.
30o
Once in force, the African Court will create an African regional human rights court. Most
critics believe that if the African Commission is complemented by an African Court, then
the latter may be just what is needed to 'give teeth' to the African human rights system.301
Thus, just maybe the rights of the children in armed conflicts might be protected.
(iv) International criminal law
The current model of international criminal law is largely based on retributive justice, as it
focuses on the criminal responsibility of perpetrators, rather than the concerns for
victims.302 Thus, the international criminal law mechanism of accountability is through the
prosecution of those who recruit child soldiers. As highlighted above in part 2.2.3, the
Rome Statute states that the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces is a war crime.
The ICC, established through the Rome Statute, has the power to exercise its jurisdiction
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When prosecutions are sought after the cessation of hostilities and the signing of a national
or bilateral peace agreement, special courts are established.
304
At times, because of the
d 305 Th' . Iterms of the peace agreements, perpetrators are not prosecute . e mternatlOna
community has criticised this culture of impunity.306 In relation to this aspect, the UN
Resolution 1379 states that member States should put an end to impunity, and prosecute
perpetrators for war crimes.307 Critically analysing the situation, the member States have to
choose the lesser of two evils: either to prosecute the perpetrators, and face the possibility
of the continuation of the armed conflict and the recruitment of child soldiers, or to offer
the perpetrators amnesty, and hope that the fighting and recruitment will cease.
308 In
accordance with their international commitment, member States are required to fulfill their
State obligation of protecting child soldiers against recruitment. It can be argued that the
member States are fulfilling their State obligation when they offer the perpetrators amnesty
instead of prosecuting them. This is because when an amnesty 'deal' is concluded, the
armed conflict seizes; thus resulting in the end to child recruitment into armed forces.
In June and August of 2007, the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) released its first two
judgements,309 which were the first judgments at international level to address the
recruitment of child soldiers.3lo Currently it is trying, in the Hague, the case against
Liberia's Charles Ghankay Taylor, who is being charged, inter alia, for the recruitment of
child soldiers.3ll The civil war in Sierra Leone brought the CDF into conflict with the
AFRC. The CDF was a security force which supported the official government of Sierra
Leone while the AFRC, which was backed by the then Liberian president, Charles Taylor,
had taken power by means of a coup. During the conflict, both forces committed a series
of human rights violations which were classified as war crimes under the Rome Statute.
Inter alia, they were charged with the enlisting of children under 15 into armed forces. The
importance of AFRC and CDF judgments is the fact that they were the first at the
304For example, the International Tribunals for-the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda(ICTR).
305 Tiefenbrurn (see note 2 above) 482.
306 Article 9(4) of the UN Security Council Resolution 1379.
307 1bid.
308 The action of the State can be justified by the defence of 'necessity' which is found under Criminal law.
309 The AFRC judgment and the CDF judgment.
310 D. Bodansky 'Special Court of Sierra Leone-International criminal law-Crimes against humanity-War
crimes-Recruitment and use of child soldiers' (2007) 101 American Journal otInternational Law 848 849.311 'J,
Prosecutor v Charles Taylor SCSL-03-01-PT.
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international level to address the recruitment of child soldiers.
312
Both judgments resulted
in a number of convictions and also acquittals. Inter alia, the three leaders of the AFRC
were found guilty of recruitment of J.mder-15s. In the CDF judgment, the two militia
leaders were not found guilty for recruitment of under-15s because there was insufficient
b 313 H h ..evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable dou t. owever, t e convIctions are
a positive aspect in the sense that it sends a clear message to the international community
that perpetrators of child soldiers related war crimes will be prosecuted.
The AFRC judgment represented the first legal analysis by an international tribunal of the
war crime of recruiting under-15s into armed forces. The tribunal held that the recruitment
of child soldiers had attained the status of customary international law.
314
In support of
this, the CDP judgment clarified this ruling by finding that the recruitment of child soldiers
had since been proscribed under customary international law.315 This was a very
significant recognition because it means that the rule is applicable to every State and no
ratification is needed to occur in order for it to be effective. Thus, the perpetrators cannot
base their argument on the principle of criminallegality;316 and this standard is binding on
both State and non-State actors.
Importantly, the ICC's fust trial focuses on child soldiers.317 This first ICC trial makes it
clear that the recruitment of children in armed combat is a war crime that will result in
prosecution at international leve1.318 The ICC trial marks a significant step in efforts to
establish responsibility for the recruitment of children into armed forces. 319 However,
these efforts are hampered by States which decide to 'harbour fugitives' rather than arrest
and surrender them to the ICC.32o For example, when the SCSL issued a warrant of arrest
for Charles Taylor for charges of war crimes, he was guaranteed safe exile in Nigeria. The
Nigerian government acted on the basis that Charles Taylor was protected by refugee
312 A. Marlowe & V. Oosterveld 'International Decision: Special Court for Sierra Leone-International
Criminal Law-Crimes Against Humanity-War Crimes-Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers' (2007) 101
American Journal ofLaw 848, 849.
313 CDF judgment para 692-3.
314 Ibid para 731.
315 AFRC judgment para 197.
316 The basis of the principle of legality is that there is no retrospective criminalisation.
317 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubango Dyilo ICC-Ol/04-01/06.
318 Human Rights Tribune 'DRC: ICC's First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers' htlp://www.humanrights-
~eneva.info/DRC-rCC-s-First-Trial-Focuses-onA048 accessed on I October 2009.
19 Ibid.
320 Khulumani Support Group 'Ignoring ICC warrant is 'unconstitutional" htlp://www.khulumani.net/in-the-
media/news/news-2009/341-ignoring-icc-warrant-is-unconstitutional.html accessed on 3 September 2009.
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status.321 He was later on arrested whilst trying to cross the border into Cameroon. More
recently, on the 4th of July 2009, the ICC issued a warrant of arrest against the Sudanese
President, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, for charges of war crimes; inter alia, the
recruitment of child soldiers, and delivered the warrant to the Sudanese government, but up
to now no action was taken. From the comments by the government, it is not likely that it
will execute the warrant of arrest.
The most distressing aspect is that the African Union has opposed the decision of the
Court, and yet the member States are parties to international law that prohibits this practice
of recruiting child soldiers; but they candidly refuse to allow justice to prevai1.
322
However, non-governmental organisations have opposed the decision of the African Union
not to co-operate with the International Criminal Court over the arrest of Sudanese
president Omar al-Bashir.323 Most of these African States that have shielded Omar al-
Bashir have ratified the Rome Statute - making it binding on them to arrest him should he
enter their respective countries.324 Thus, ignoring the ICC warrant is contrary to their
obligation under international law.325 However, this aspect shows the weakness of
international law because there are no provisions that address the issue of compelling
member States to fulfil their international obligations, and the measures that can be taken
for non-compliance.
One of the most controversial concerns surrounding child soldiers is the issue of criminal
responsibility of child soldiers for atrocities they themselves have committed in armed
conflicts. Child soldiers are responsible for some of the most horrific atrocities and
breaches of human rights committed in armed conflicts and therefore under international
law.326 Different views are held about the question of accountability after the war.327
McIntyre argues that the notion of children themselves perpetrating atrocities has been met
321 Amnesty International 'Nigeria: Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the Federal High Court reviewing
refugee status granted to Charles Taylor' (2004) AI Index: AFR 44/030/2004 1, 3.
322 Khulumani Support Group (see note 319 above).
323 Ibid.
324 Article 59 of the Rome Statute.
325 In accordance with article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, if a member State ignores its obligation 'the Court
may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security
Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council'.
326Musila (see note 6 above) 321.
327 Some, hold the view that children should be tried and punished, while others argue that since they are
children efforts should focus on rehabilitation.
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with scepticism, antagonism and hasty dismissals of responsibility.328 On the other hand,
Musila argues that 'one cannot take an absolutist stance on this, as child soldiers, though
guilty of crimes, are themselves victims' .329 Happold argues that children should be
accountable for the atrocities they commit; he poses a very controversial and complex
question as to how far it should be taken into account that child soldiers are forcefully
d b b · J' d . .. 330recruited into armed forces and are then abuse y emg lorce to commIt atrocIties.
Under international law, the prosecution of children is not prohibited.33 ] Although not
necessarily addressed, both the CR!= and the African Charter do not exclude the
prosecution of children at international leve1.332 In international criminal law, neither the
ICC, International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) nor International Tribunal of
Rwanda ICTR) has explicitly given jurisdiction to tribunals to try juveniles. The Rome
Statute expressly prohibits the prosecution of children.333 However, the Statute of the
SCSL is the first international document that expressly provides for the prosecution of
children for international crimes.334 It has been argued that if prosecution is to be
considered as an option for holding child soldiers accountable, in both international and
national courts, certain minimum standards should be met to cater for their vulnerable
positions.335 More disturbing is that, as highlighted in part 1.5, children join armed forces
due to distress, but the ICTY has denied the defence of duress for war crimes involving
killing.336 Nevertheless, there have been positive developments from the ICC, which
appears to overrule the case law of the ICTY which denies the defence of duress for war
crimes involving killing. 337 Thus children who are forcefully recruited into armed forces
and are then abused by being forced to commit atrocities can now raise the defence of
duress. This aspect caters for the vulnerable position of children.
328 McIntyre (see note 91 above) 7.
329 Musila (see note 6 above) 322.
330 M. Happold Child Soldiers in International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2005 183.
331 ' ,
Mezmur (see note 11 above) 211.
332 They do not preclude the prosecution of children of whatever age, but it is recognised that children can be
tried in accordance with domestic law, and they provide special protection for children within such process.
Article 40 of the CRC and article17 of the African Charter.
333 Article 26 of the Rome Statute.
334 Article 7 of the Statute to the SCSL.
335 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 212.
336 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-T.
337 Article 31 (1)(d) of the Rome Statute allows for the defence of duress for war crimes involving killings.
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It is asserted that the retributive paradigm of international criminal law is narrow in
perspective, since it does not make a distinction of the different kinds of perpetrators that
may require special attention?38 In support of this contention, Musila argues that
international criminal law, as currently structured, is not suited for the child perpetrator.
339
A number of international human rights organisations have objected to children being held
criminally accountable for their actions because they view prosecution as being detrimental
to the rehabilitation of the child?40 Instead of ordering imprisonment, the Statute of the
SCSL can order a limited number of rehabilitative measures.341 Although the ICTY
supports the retributive program of international law, it should move away from this
mindset and incorporate rehabilitative measures. In regards to the Rome Statute, it is
commendable as it prohibits the prosecution of children;342 and the only inference that can
be drawn from this is that it thus favours rehabilitative measures. Recently, the
international responses to atrocities committed by children have seen favour for 'hybrid'
tribunals, which facilitates the employment of domestic options of restorative justice
mechanisms, hand in hand with the rehabilitative justice mechanisms.343
(iv) International labour law
Article 7(1) of the ILO Convention 182, states that member States are obliged to provide
for the effective enforcement and implementation of the provisions contained in the
instrument by imposing penal sanctions for breaches and non-compliance. As has been
seen over the years, the agents of the States do not comply with these provisions.344 For
example, the government-sponsored militia forces recruit child soldiers. 345 What is more
disturbing is that at times, governments of the member States do not impose penal
sanctions on their agents. 346 For example, both the Ugandan and Sierra Leonean
governments were aware of the fact that their government-sponsored militia forces,
respectively, the LDU and CDF were r~cruiting child soldiers into their forces, but no penal
338 0 Van Bueren 'The international law on rights of the child' cited in Musila (see note 6 above) 325.
339 Musila (see note 6 above) 324.
340 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 180.
341 Article 7(2) of the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (2002).
342 Article 26 of the Rome Statute.
343 For example, in Sierra Leone, the operation of the TRC side by side with the SCSL. Musila (see note 6
above) 324.
344 Human Rights Watch 'More than 120000 children fighting in Africa'
http://www.hrw.org.pressI1999/aps/cs0419.htm accesed 8 February 2009.
345 Ibid.
346 Article I of the ILO Convention 182.
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sanctions were issued against the forc~s?47 It will be unfair for the government to impose
sanctions for non-compliance on non-state agents, if it is not going to impose sanctions for
non-compliance to its own agencies. This was an oversight on the part of the drafters of
the ILO Convention 182.
(v) Conclusion
In conclusion it can be argued that the reason for the continuation of the recruitment of
child soldiers is caused by the ineffectiveness of the monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. Important to note is that particularly in Africa, both the political willingness
to adhere to already existing obligations, as well as the readiness to think along new lines in
terms of more effective enforcement mechanisms, which are necessary prerequisites for
improved enforcement are lacking. Furthermore, the relationship between international
law and municipal law is by no means clear-cut. In respect to this aspect, there are two
schools of thought in the respect; the dualist and the monist. However, some of the African
States, who believe in the dualist theory, have implemented international law prohibiting
the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces into their municipal law, but have failed
to implement it. Many of these laws have incorporated stipulations that diminish their
effectiveness. Thus, the reluctance or failure of African governments to initiate measures
that will help curb the problem is a major factor that encourages the recruitment of child
soldiers.
2.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE
RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS
The recruitment of child soldiers is paradoxical, in that international law relating to the
recruitment of child soldiers is contradictory.348 It is therefore not surprising that the law
relating to the recruitment of child soldiers is vague and often unclear. Thus, after
considering all the relevant treaties, the provisions that relate to child soldiers are
conflicting with each other and this causes a fair amount of legal ambiguity.349 For
example, AP-I, AP-II, CRC, and the Rome Statute set 15 years as benchmark for
recruitment, whilst the African Charter, Optional Protocol to the CRC and the ILO
347 Human Rights Watch 'Uganda' (see note 247 above) and CDF judgment.
348 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 162.
349 Ibid 188.
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350 h' d ~. I'Convention 182 take the straight-18 approach. Furthermore, t e treaties eler m re atlOn
to the nature of the hostilities. The AP-I, CRC, African Charter, Optional Protocol to the
CRC all prohibit children from taking 'direct part' in hostilities, whilst the AP-II and the
Rome Statute refer to both 'direct' and 'indirect' hostilities.
351
As highlighted above in part 2.2.1, the AP-II focuses on internal conflicts. The AP-II
requires a higher degree of intensity for its application, as it does not apply to riots or to
isolated and sporadic acts of violence, which have not reached the level of internal armed
conflicts.352 Unfortunately, its application in the African context will be close to non-
existent because most current conflicts involving child soldiers in Africa will be below the
AP-II threshold since they will not have reached the so-called 'level of internal armed
conflicts,.353 On a positive note, article 22(3) of the African Charter provides that it applies
to children caught up in lower levels of violence described as 'tension and strife'. With
regards to this aspect, the African Charter breaks new ground by expanding the scope of
international humanitarian law. The provisions of the Charter apply to children in
situations of internal tension and strife which were ordinarily regulated by domestic law.354
Thus, children involved in riots, isolated and sporadic acts will be protected by the African
Charter.
The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, CRC and Rome Statute state that
a child soldier is any person under the age of eighteen, but above the age of 15.
Surprisingly, as mentioned above, the CRC defines a child as any person 'below the age of
18 years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier' ,355 but
later on in the document it provides 15 as the minimum age of recruitment,356 The reason
behind this contradiction is that the 'straight 18' position could not be adopted as it faced
serious challenges from countries like the US.357 The 'straight 18' position was challenged
due to the fact that some of the countries involved during the finalizing of the instrument
350 Article 77(2) of the AP-l, article 4(3)(c), article 38(2) ofthe CRC, article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome
Statute, article 22(2) of the Mrican Charter, article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC and article 1 of the
ILO Convention 182.
351 Ibid.
352 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 201.
353 [bid.
::: G. Van Bueren 'The intemationallaw on rights of the child' cited in Musila (see note 6 above) 327.
Article I of the CRe. -
356 Article 38 ibid.
357 Mezmur (see note II above) 202.
48
permitted recruitment of under-18s, and they did not want to move away from that
practice.358 For example, 17 year olds have been a major part of US military
recruitment.359
Ironically, in a number of countries the age of majority is deemed to be twenty-one,360 and
a number of international and regional treaties regard 18 as the minimum age for
recruitment into armed forces. 361 Thus, there is already some indication of contradicting
provisions between the age of majority in a number of countries and the minimum age of
recruitment into armed forces. The failure of the CRC to adopt the 'straight 18' position is
what led to the darting and subsequent adoption of the Optional Protocol to the CRC.
362
The conflicting provisions contained in the various legal treaties dealing with child soldiers
create legal uncertainty and at the end of the day result in further injustice for the child.
363
The issue of age is a complex one. The two Additional Protocols of 1977, the CRC and the
Rome Statute prohibit recruitment of under-15s into armed forces. The AP-I is only
applicable to international armed conflict, and the AP-II is applicable to non-international
conflicts. The Optional Protocol to the CRC, African Charter and the ILO Convention 182
raise the minimum age of recruitment from 15 to 18. The Optional Protocol to the CRC
has, nevertheless, retained 15 years as the minimum age of voluntary enlistment. The
discrepancy in the ages illustrates how international law is inconsistent.
The two Additional Protocols of 1997, the CRC, the Rome Statute and the Optional
Protocol to the CRC urge the State parties to take 'all feasible measures' to ensure that
persons who have not attained the age of 15 years are not recruited into armed forces. 364
The nature of the State obligation is vague. The employment of the expression 'all feasible
measures' could be considered as a lesser and more imprecise obligation on the part of the
358 'The International Save the Children Alliance position on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Chid regarding the use and the recruitment of children in hostilities' htlp://www.scslat.org
accessed I October 2009.
359 B. Yarchyk 'Compliance decisions with regards to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
two Optional Protocols: Reflections on the theories of international law' (2008) Honours Thesis, Ohio State
University I, 26.
360 In South Africa, the Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972 has recently been amended by the Children's Act 38
of 2005 to reduce the age of majority to eighteen.
361 The African Charter and Optional Protocol to the CRe.
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364 Article 77(2) of the AP-I, article 4(3)(c) of the AP-II, article 38(2) of the CRC, article 1 of the Optional
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State/65 as compared to 'all necessary measures' which has been adopted by the African
Charter; thus obviously according a better standard of protection for children. Simply
requiring that State parties in international armed conflict take all 'feasible measures'
provides a claw-back, causing the rule to be emasculated.
366
The scope of the obligation
contained in it is one of conduct rather that results.
367
The CRC, Optional Protocol to the CRC and the African Charter all prohibit children
taking a 'direct part' in hostilities. 'Direct' participation implies a combatant position and
excludes supplementary roles (serving as scouts, porters, and the like).368 Reference to
only 'direct' hostilities creates a serious limitation of the rule as it fails to refer to and
specifically make illegal indirect engagements which are equally damaging for children.
369
Thus, according to the above treaties, this might be taken to mean that children can be
recruited into armed forces, as long as they do not take part in direct hostilities. This will
however defeat the purpose of international law, which is to protect the children because
their mere presence within the vicinity of the war zone is a risk imperilling life, survival
and development.
The wording of the above treaties actually lowers the minimum standard set down for
internal armed conflicts in the AP-II, which refers to both, 'direct' and 'indirect'
hostilities.37o More recently the concept of 'participation in hostilities' in relation to the
provisions in the Rome Statute has been extended to cover both direct participation in
combat and also active participation in military activities linked to combat, such as
scouting, spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military check
points. 371 This extension is significant for the protection of child soldiers because there is
now specific reference to the illegality of recruitment of child soldiers for indirect
engagements. Thus, recruitment for both direct and indirect engagements is now
prohibited by international law?72 Consequently, this will only be applicable to State
parties to the Rome Statute. Importantly, human rights norms do not have the same status
365 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 204.
366 Singh (note 3 above) 216.
367 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 204.
368 [bid 205.
369 [bid.
370 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 172.
37\ Mezmur (see note 11 above) 202.
372 The Rome Statute.
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under international law; some of the norms having achieved the status of customary
international law.373 As highlighted above in part 2.2.1, the norm of the prohibition of
recruitment for both direct and indirect hostilities has achieved customary law status. Thus,
even if the States are not parties to the Rome Statute, the norm is applicable to them. The
norm applies to non-international conflicts,374 and the significance of this to the African
situation is the fact that most of the conflicts in Africa are internal.
The Optional Protocol to the CRC, whilst being an effectual landmark in the plight against
the recruitment of child soldiers, does not offer children adequate protection.375 By
allowing voluntary recruitment into a State's armed forces of 15 years olds under article
3(3), it lowers the level of protection for children who volunteer to join governmental
armed forces. 376 The idea of voluntarism among child recruits has been fiercely debated,
particularly in the context of the notorious forced recruitment methods of groups such as
Uganda's LRA, Mozambique's RENAMO and Sierra Leone's RUF.377 The voluntary
participation of these children is often a response to pressure of some subtle nature?78 For
example, the children are coerced into joining the armed forces by being forced to kill
those they know, thus making them feel guilty to return to society. Also, a recent study of
child soldiers in Central Africa found that two-thirds of the children were recruited
'voluntarily,;379 and in this case as well the issue of volunteerism can be debated. Children
sometimes feel compelled due to the political, social and economic conditions directing
their lives to 'voluntarily' join the armed forces. 38o
This provision of voluntary recruitment establishes that upon ratification, governments
must deposit a binding declaration with the UN General Secretary starting their minimum
. . 381 A h b .recrUItmg age. ss own a ove In part 1.5, some of the governments of the State parties
373 R. Howse & M. Mutua 'Protecting human rights in a global economy: Challenges for the World Trade
Organisation' (2000) International Centre for Buman Rights and Democratic Development 1, 5.
http://www.ichradd.ca accessed 1 October 2009.
374 Article 4(3)(c) of AP-II.
375 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 175.
376 [bid.
377 Mclntyre (see note 91 above) 15.
378 Van Niekerk (see note 65 above) 65.
379 N. Cahn 'Poor children: child "witches" and child soldiers in sub-Saharan Africa' (2006) Ohio State
Journal ofCriminal Law, 413,419.
380 P. W. Singer & J.J. Myers 'Children at war' http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5098.html accessed
on 7 February 2009.
381 Article 3(2).
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, 382 b ' h 1 1 I' 't t'have laid down the minimum age for recrUItment, ut sometnnes, t ese ega lml a IOns
are defied at will and government forc~s recruit under-aged children. For example, despite
the fact that Uganda has laid down 18 years as the minimum age for recruitment, the UPDF
recruited children under the age of 18 years 01d.383 Also Sierra Leone has laid down 17 and
a half years as the minimum age for recruitment, but the CDF, a government-sponsored
militia force, recruits children under this age into its forces,384
Nevertheless, to ensure that recruitment is voluntary, the Optional Protocol to the CRC
mandates four safeguards.385 For reasons discussed above in part 1.5, although the
safeguards can play an imperative role in screening out children who do not fulfil the
minimum requirements, their practicality in the African context is questionable. For
example, the safeguard that requires reliable proof of age prior recruitment is not helpful in
Africa. In some parts of Africa, birth registration and identity registration and identity
documents are inadequate or not existent and some of the children do not know their age,386
Many of these children are living in poverty, and often they are without parental care, or
live as refugees, displaced or orphans. Thus, it sounds impractical to expect them to sign
up voluntarily with the consent ofthei; parents or legal guardians,387
However, the possibility of genuine volunteerism, at least in exceptional cases cannot be
ruled out,388 For example, in Sierra Leone, young combatants have a remarkable
understanding of the political causes for the war they are fighting and are not coerced by
adults to join the armed forces,389 Therefore, a tension is created between the right to
rt" t' 390 d h 'h ' 391 N h 1 h' ., I dpa IClpa IOn, an t e ng t to protectIOn, onet e ess, t IS tensIOn IS so ve by the
'best interests of the child' principle,392 However, it is important for the international
382 Burundi (16), Angola & Sudan (17), Sierra Leone (17.5), Ethopia, Uganda, Liberia & Rwanda all state
that children under the age of 18 may not be recruited, the DRC & Somalia have no legal limitation on child
recruitment. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 'Africa Report' 2001 (see note 57 above).
383Human Rights Watch 'Uganda' (see note 247 above).
384 Human Rights Watch 'More than 120000 children fighting in Africa' (see note 331 above).
385 Article 3(3) '(a) such recruitment is genuinely voluntary; (b) such recruitment is carried out with the
informed consent of the person's parents or legal guardians; (c) such persons are fully informed of the duties
involved in such military service; (d) such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into
armed military service.'
386 Machel (see note 74 above) 16.
387 Mezmur (note 11 above) 205.
388 Lee (see note 26 above) 17.
389 Ibid 13&28.
390 Article 12 of the CRe.
391 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 206.
392 Article 3 of the CRC & article 4 of the African Charter.
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community not to disregard the concept of agency which 'refers to one's active
engagement with the world and their own efforts to cope with adversity' .393 Children do
not live in an abstract world; they are part of the world, and whatever happens in the world
has a direct impact on them. Thus, during war time, young people should be given the
right to participate in the matters that directly affect them; even if it means them
participating directly or indirectly in the conflict,394
As mentioned above, the consequence of article 3(3) of the Optional Protocol to the CRC is
that it allows voluntary recruitment by the government, while article 4(1) prohibits the
same from being exercised by non-governmental armed forces. This is a creditable step
since the recruitment of child soldiers is more extensive among non-governmental armed
forces than government forces. For example, in the LRA it is reported that children make
up 80 percent of its armies,395 and the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR) and its sub-groups, Coalition des patriotes resistants congolais (PARECO), Forces
democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Armed Forces of the DRC
(AFRC) continue to recruit children into their forces. 396 The Optional Protocol to the CRC
has double standards as it provides different standards for armed forces to a Member State
and non-State armed forces. 397 It is most probable that non-State armed forces will not feel
obliged to abide by a standard which is different from that imposed on the State.
This aspect also puts in question the issue of impartiality of the whole instrument from the
point of view of rebel forces; in the sense that the rebels might deem it irrational and thus,
its general application can be undermined. 398 The different standards for State armed
forces and the non-State parties were also prescribed in the two Additional Protocols; 399
but considering the difficulties that might result from this, the Optional Protocol to the
CRC re-iterated them. The CRC's trauvax preparatories reveal that some delegations were
concerned that specific provisions would derogate from obligations undertaken by State
393 Lee (see note 26 above) 25.
394 Ibid.
395 S. Brownback and R.E. Steams 'Africa's Forgotten War' Washington Times (2005)
http://washingtontimes.com!op-edJ20050308-094129-9853r.htm accessed 19 June 2009.
396 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General: Uganda and the DRC
(2208) S/2008/693 and Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General
(2009) A/63/785-S/2009/158.
397 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 176; Singh (see note 3 above) 2]7; Mezmur (see note] 1 above)
206-7.
398 Mezmur (see note] 1 above) 207.
399 AP-I applies to international armed conflicrs and AP-II applies to non-international armed conflicts.
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parties pursuant to other international treaties.4oo Thus they maintained the status quo in
respect to some of the provisions that would result in derogations.
As highlighted in part 1.1, the Optional Protocol to the CRC in paragraph 11 of its
preamble condemns 'with the gravest concern the recruitment, training, and use within and
across national border children in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the armed forces
of a State.' Unfortunately, a preamble only helps with the interpretation of a treaty in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose,40J and has no enacting force. In the same line,
the Palermo Protocol in article 3(c) provides that 'the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered
'trafficking in persons". This lead is not substantiated any further or anywhere else in the
respective treaties;402 thus it has limited use in addressing the issue since it has no
substantive provision to regulate the practice. Also, the lead in the preamble of the
Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is not followed in any
substantive provision.403
Although the two treaties are the only international documents that mention child
recruitment across borders they are both of limited use in addressing the issue. Child cross-
border recruitment makes the applicability of the existing provisions of the Optional
Protocol to the CRC and the Palermo Protocol difficult.404 The Committee on the CRC has
supported the recommendations made by the Secretary General in the report of February
2005 to call upon States to combat illicit cross-border activities harmful to children through
the development of bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements.405 However,
experience has shown that States are reluctant in enforcing obligations especially if they are
involved in the practice that has to be prohibited.406 The international community should
400 S. Detrick The United Nations Convention on the Rights o/the Child: A guide to the "Travaux
prepatories" (1992) Dordrecht: Martinus Niijhoff Publishers 713.
401 Article 31(l)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
402 Mezmur (note 11 above) 208.
403 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
405 Committee on the Rights of the Child 'CRC 41th session: Committee considers initial report of
Bangladesh on involvement of children in armed conflict' http://www.hrea.orgllists/child-
rights/markup/msg00377.html accesed on 5 October 2009.
406 An example of this is the situation with the Ugandan government.
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specifically provide a treaty that has substantive provisions on the child cross-border
recruitment because this issue has become wide spread, particularly to Africa.
Thus, the recruitment of child soldiers is paradoxical, in that international law relating to
the recruitment of child soldiers is contradictory. It is therefore not surprising that the law
relating to the recruitment of child soldiers is vague and often unclear. The conflicting
provisions contained in the various legal treaties dealing with child soldiers create legal
uncertainty and at the end of the day result in further injustice for the child. As a result,
after considering all the relevant treaties, the provisions that relate to child soldiers are
conflicting with each other and this causes a fair amount of legal ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
Despite the various international treaties prohibiting the practice of child recruitment, there
is incontrovertible evidence that the problem is continuing on a large scale and new
challenges keep emerging.407 Furthermore, even regardless of the fact that the norm on the
prohibition of recruitment of children into armed forces has acquired customary law status,
recruitment has still continued. The' loopholes', vagueness and inconsistencies have the
potential of creating legal uncertainty which will ultimately result in further injustice for
the child. Due to such a complex and contradictory international law framework, State
parties hide themselves behind the lower international standards.
However, article 41 of the CRC states that if any provisions contained in the law of a
Member State or international law in force for that State are more conducive to the
realisation of the rights of the child, the provisions have to take precedence over the CRC.
Although this provision is only applicable to member States of the CRC - the only
exceptions are the US and Somalia who are not parties to the CRC - such a standard should
be used in respect to all the international treaties that prohibit the recruitment of child
soldiers. With the very diverse standards set in the different international treaties, this
standard will offer better protection to children involved in the practice. However, the
relationship between international law and municipal law is by no means clear-cut. There
are two schools of thoughts in this respect; the dualist and the monist. Thus, the
enforcement of international human rights into municipal law becomes problematic.
407 For example, the issue of cross-border recruitment.
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In addition, most of the treaties do not offer equal protection to children who are recruited
into armed forces. The issue of age is a complex one. The two Additional Protocols of
1977, the CRC and the Rome Statute prohibit recruitment of under-15s into armed forces.
Whilst, the Optional Protocol to the CRC, African Charter and the ILO Convention 182
raise the minimum age of recruitment from 15 to 18. Ironically, in a number of countries
the age of majority is deemed to be twenty_one.408 Thus, there is already some indication
of contradicting provisions between the age of majority in a number of countries and the
minimum age of recruitment into armed forces. The overall definition of a child under
international law is 18 years, thus in order to offer equal protection to children all treaties
should have maintained the age of 18, or even increased the age.
It can be argued that the legal uncertainty is not per se the cause of recruitment continuing.
The cause is more complex than legal uncertainty. Even though the some member States
are incorporating the international law into municipal law, they are not being enforced.
There is simply no political willingness to enforce these laws. Furthermore, the
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms embodied in the treaties are not as effective as
was anticipated. The main problem is that there is simply no political willingness to
enforce these laws. Although some of the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have
generated positive outcomes; overall, most of them are simply too 'weak' and this has lead
to the further prejudice for the child. What is needed to curb the problem of child soldiers
is a positive attitude from the member States and also support in relation to the enforcement
and monitoring mechanisms.
408 In South Africa, the Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972 has recently been amended by the Children's Act 38
of 2005 to reduce the age of majority to eighteen.
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CHAPTER 3: THE RECRUITMENT 9F ClllLD SOLDIERS IN AFRICA: SELECTED
ASPECTS
3.1 THE RECRUITMENT OF ClllLD SOLDIERS IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW
Although the issue of 'child soldiers' is not peculiar to Africa, research has shown that this
problem is critical on this continent. An astonishing part of the continent has been at war,
both inter- and intra- State conflicts, for the past decades.
409
A prevalent feature of these
conflicts is the widespread recruitment of child soldiers. The recruitment of child soldiers
has been prohibited by the international community because it violates the rights of the
children.41o Children who are recruited into armed forces face abusive treatment,411 their
lives are placed in danger, and they are deprived of educational opportunities and
livelihoods.412
The involvement of children in conflict is not a recent phenomenon. The military use of
children dates back to ancient times.413 This shows that our views regarding the legitimacy
and morality of children's military -participation is a historical construct, shaped by
particular social and political forces.414 The fact that the discourse of 'child soldiers' exists
as a historical construct, there is bound to be possible gaps between the global discourse
and local realities.415 Thus, due to the 'moral panics and the new wars,;416 which have
changed the global assumptions and images of children,417 the discourse of 'child soldiers'
will not be perceived the same way as it was before. The change of warfare and the
advocating of the protection of children's rights within the global discourse context has
409 Uganda, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Corte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Liberia,
Central Africa, Rwanda, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Libya, Niger and Chad. Rialize (see note 54 above) 39.
410 A. McIntyre 'Rights, root causes and recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed conflicts' (2003) 12
African Security Review, 93, 93.
411 For example, the children are brutalized in order to harden them into more ruthless soldiers and the
recruitment for girls may lead to sex slavery.
412 UNICEF 'Children at both ends of the gun' http://www.unicef.org/graca/kidsoldi.htm accessed 5 October
2009.
413 For example, in ancient civilization of the Spartans, boys were taken from their homes for military training
at the age of seven. S. Stavrou et al 'The Reintegration of Child Soldiers and Adducted Children: A case
study of Palaro and Pabbo Gala Districtn Northern Uganda' in E. Bennett (see note 44 above) 25.
414 Lee (see note 26 above) 2.
415 Ibid.
416 Moral panic refers to 'the reaction of social groups to the false or (more often) exaggerated perception that
some kind of behaviour or a group is dangerously deviant and poses a menace to the very basis of social
order'. E. Ben-Ari 'Facing child soldiers, moral issues, and 'real soldiering': anthropological perspectives on
professional armed forces' (2009) 37( 1) Scientia Militaria: South African Journal ofMilitary Studies 1, 13.
417 Ibid 12.
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taken the discourse on child and youth involvement in conflict out of the political and
military context and placed it into one circumscribed by legal and moral concern.
418
It has been estimated that there are arollnd 300, 000 child soldiers worldwide, of which half
are in Africa.419 However, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has reported a
number of more than 500,000 children having been recruited in both, State and non-State
armed forces in over 85 countries.42o Boyden cautions that it is quite 'ludicrous to talk
about child soldiering as an 'epidemic' on the basis of speculative UN figures,.421 Ben-Ari
argues that, 'in an environment pervaded by fears of world disorder, research centres, think
tanks, security experts, and researchers in various disciplines linked to policymakers and
decision-makers, journalists and the general public have propagated a view of young
soldiers as a veritable scourge' .422 These responses are usually fuelled by media reporting
around the issue of the recruitment of child soldiers; such as the speculative figures of
children being recruited into armed forces. On a positive note, a recent UN (2009) report
indicates that the number of children being recruited into armed forces in Africa is
declining.423
Since the late 1970s, a number of international instruments have been promulgated to limit
the recruitment of child soldiers, but even though the numbers of children being recruited
into armed forces has decreased, children continue to be deployed into armed forces,
particularly in Africa.424 One would have thought that with the promulgation of these
international instruments that prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces,
the practice would have been 'extinct'. The continuous enactment of international
. instruments that prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers, although it has limited the
practice of recruitment of child soldiers, has not stopped the practice in its totality. There
are obstacles to an effective protection of children against recruitment by international law.
Thus, in order to 'extinguish' the practice, it is important to assess the obstacles that have
418 McIntyre (see note 91 above) 10.
419 Musila (see note 6 above) 332.
420 IRINnews.org 'Too little to be fighing anyone's wars' (see note 51 above).
4211. Boyden, 'Children, War and World Disorder in the 21st Century: A Review of the Theories and the
Literature on Children's Contributions to Armed Violence' (2006) 138 Working Paper Series 1 3.
422 'Ben-Ari (see note 416 above) 12.
423 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General (2009) UN Document
A/63/785-S/2009/158.
424 Tiefenbrum (see note 2 above) 434.
58
'stood' in the way of an effective protection of children against recruitment by international
law; only then can the practice of recruitment of child soldiers be eradicated.
In Chapter 3, the researcher investigates the obstacles to an effective protection of children
against recruitment by international law. The research focuses particularly on two aspects
less explored - the issues of culture and cross-border recruitment, with focus on Africa.
The objective of this chapter is to as~ess the impact that the above obstacles have on an
effective implementation of international law. The investigation will provide a good basis
for understanding why the issue of child soldiers is more critical on this continent. When
discussing the situation on the African continent, the research will make repeated referrals
to three countries, namely Uganda, Sierra Leone and the DRC.
The reason why the research will repeatedly be on the above-mentioned three countries is
because in Uganda, Sierra Leone and the DRC the issue of the recruitment of child soldiers
is relatively widespread, and they are also parties to the relevant conventions.425 Uganda is
the most well-known case involving the forceful recruitment of child soldiers, where the
LRA is made up almost entirely of 12 000 children abducted from their families, and has
achieved global infamy in this regard.426 The referral to the DRC is useful because of the
cross-border recruitment, which has become wide spread in Africa.427 Lastly, by referring
to Sierra Leone, the researcher attempts to understand the impact of the lived realities at the
local level on child recruitment in Africa which sometimes contrast with the global
humanitarian discourse.428 Thus, the ;epeated referral to these countries allows a practical
analysis of the problem of child soldiers based on contemporary examples.
Clearly, international law has not been able to eradicate the practice of the recruitment of
child soldiers into armed forces. Research has shown that there are aspects of children's
recruitment into armed forces that are not acknowledged in the global humanitarian
discourse.429 Lee argues that it is insufficient to talk about the recruitment of child soldiers
425 International Committee of Red Cross 'Member States to the Following International Humanitarian Law
and Other Related Treaties as of 26-Aug-2009' and ICRC 'International Humanitarian Law - Treaties &
Documents' (see note 15 above).
426 P. W. Singer 'Talk is cheap: Getting serious about preventing child soldiers' (2004) 37 Cornell
International Law Journal 561,572.
427 Other countries that are involved the issue of cross-border recruitment are Liberia, Guinea, Burkina Faso
and Sierra Leone.
428 Lee (see note 26 above) 1, fn 1.
429 Ibid 19.
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simply as a clear case of barbarity and abuse of children.
43o
On the contrary, he further
argues that to say that child soldiering may be 'meaningful' does not necessarily mean that
it is a legitimate or 'good' practice for children.431 Thus, in this study, it is finally argued
that, when addressing the issue of child soldiers in Africa, there is a need to look beyond a
set of laws in understanding and addressing the phenomenon. Relying on global discourse
on the aspect of the recruitment of child soldiers and failing to employ this kind of
engagement in the local context of their recruitment may lead to negative consequences for
the intended beneficiaries.432
The issue of child cross-border recruitment has become wide spread in Africa. Cross-
border recruitment arises whenever there is a conflict occurring in a different country
within a region, and children are recruited from the territory of another country.433
International documents have not substantially addressed the issue of cross-border
recruitment, and not much research has been conducted on it. This omission creates an
obstacle to the implementation of the international law under the circumstances. As
highlighted above in part 2.4, the existing international law provisions found in the
Optional Protocol to the CRC and the Palermo Protocol are difficult to apply in such
situations, thus making it difficult to protect children against cross-border recruitment and
to apply enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. As long as the issue of child cross-
border recruitment is not adequately addressed within international law, children will
continue to be recruited across borders. On the other hand, it can be argued that
substantiating the provisions that relate to child cross-border will not do much to help the
children involved. This is because, although there are substantiated provisions that relate to
the general recruitment of child soldiers, the practice still persists. Thus, the issues of child
cross-border recruitment and culture can objectively be viewed as obstacles to an effective
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Culture is 'an amorphous concept denoting anything that contributes to the unique
character of a social group, thereby distinguishing it from other groups' .434 Thus, societies
conserve their cultures as to ensure that they keep their distinct characteristics, and their
cultures continue to serve the interests of the practitioners.
435
It follows that culture may
include artifacts, language, laws, customs and moral codes, or in fact, a people's entire
intellectual and material heritage.436 Tradition, which is the process of transmitting
knowledge and beliefs to future generations, is part and parcel of culture.
437
Not only is
tradition the means for keeping a culture alive but it is also the means whereby items of
culture gain moral authority.438 It has been argued that cultural identity is one of the most
important parts of a person's identity; and a person's identity will be seriously undermined
if they are not permitted to follow their culture.439 However, culture is not static and
harmful practices can be overcome.440
It is important to note that, in the past, African societies were governed by customs; thus
through tradition, some customs have gained moral authority. Therefore, with the drafting
of international treaties it was important to 'marry' the two wherever possible.441 However,
contradictions between children's rights and the culture are inevitable, in particularly when
practices which are considered to be in 'cultural' conflict with the standards set by
international human rights norms.442 Despite the fact that the practice of child recruitment
is both detrimental to children, and is also prohibited under international law, in certain
countries it has become a socially accepted practice that children get recruited into armed
forces. 443
As suggested above, when addressing the issue of culture, due to time and space
constraints, the researcher will only focus on Sierra Leone. By referring to Sierra Leone,
the researcher attempts to understand the impact of the lived realities at the local level on
child recruitment in Africa which sometimes contrast with the global humanitarian
434 Bennett (see note 44 above) 2.
435 L. Price 'Conserving (not preserving) culture: Avoiding the damage to culture of veiled moralism in HIV
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discourse.444 Thus, the referral to this country allows a practical analysis of the problem of
child soldiers based on contemporary _examples. However, based on research done, lived
realities at the local level on child recruitment in Africa sometimes contrasts with the
global humanitarian discourse.
3.2.1 Background to the situation in Sierra Leone
In 1991, war erupted in the diamond-rich West African country, Sierra Leone.
445
The
country's recourse to warfare represented the massive betrayal of the hopes and
expectations of various groups.446 RUF, led by Corporal Foday Sankoh, launched a
devastating attack on Sierra Leone from Liberia in May 1991, with the support of the then
Liberian leader, Charles Taylor. Sierra Leone was a country notorious for its recruitment
of child soldiers in its 10-year civil war.447 Both the government forces and rebels
recruited children. Sierra Leone had one of the world's worst records for recruiting
children as soldiers.448 Children served as combatants or as cooks, informants, porters,
bodyguards, sentries, and spies. Graphic media images of traumatised youth with
amputated limbs brought much international attention to the problem of child soldiers in
Sierra Leone.449
Between 1992 and 1996, the period of the worst fighting between the government forces
and the RUF, an estimated 4,500 children were recruited by both sides.45o However,
according to the UN Works for Kids, during the 10-year civil war in Sierra Leone, 10000
children were recruited into armed forces. 451 On 7 July 1999, a peace agreement was
signed between the government and the rebel force (RUF), but contrary to popular
expectations, the 1999 peace accord failed to restore lasting peace in Sierra Leone.
Omotolo argues that attempts to explain the complicated dynamics of the Sierra Leone civil
444 Lee (see note 26 above) 1.
445 J. Omotola 'The Sierra Leone Lome Peace Accord' (2007) 3 Conflict Trends 38, 38-39.
446 Ibid 39.
447 BCC News 'AK-47: the Sierra Leone child soldier' http://news.bbc.co.ukJ2/hi/europe/4500358.stm
accessed on 5 October 2009.
448 Kalis (see note 77 above).
449 Ibid.
450 ReliefWeb 'The use of child soldiers in Africa: An overview. United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)' (2001) http://www.reliefweb. int/library/documents/chilsold.html accessed
5 October 2009.
451 The UN Works for Kids 'Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone'
http://www.un.org/works/goingon/soldiers/goingon soldiers.html accessed 5 October 2009.
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war suggest that the civil war was largely economically determined, and precipitated by the
competition for scarce natural resources such as timber, gold and diamonds.
452
In Sierra Leone, the practice of 'child soldiering' is understood differently in the local
socio-economic contexts.453 The West~rn conception of childhood is seen as a period when
children belong in schools and in their family, and furthermore as the responsibility of the
community to protect them from the horrors of warfare;454 whereas childhood in Sierra
Leone is almost defined by various types of labour.455 Children are expected to perform
domestic labour from an early age and to help adults with whatever work they are doing.
In addition to the socio-economic practicality, child labour is also based on cultural norms
regarding children's development,456 During the war, this socio-economic context of child
labour most likely influenced the way people understood military recruitment; children
were regarded as necessary 'peripheral participants' who perform various 'domestic'
labour for the military community.457 For example, since work such as fetching water or
doing laundry has been locally established as 'children's work' the armed forces recruited
children to undertake these tasks.458 Even though some did participate in military
activities, they did so 'within a system in which it made sense for children to be part of
adult activity' .459
In Sierra Leone most children do not leave with their families. 46o In West Africa, there is a
practice of fosterage, which is governed by the predominant norms which stipulate that
'everyone must be accounted for by someone else. ,461 Such a prevalent practice of
fosterage and norms of patronage shaped the understandings and dynamics of children's
military recruitment during the war.462 Many communities and children understood
452 Omotola (see note 445 above) 39.
453 Lee (see note 26 above) 16.
454 OCHA 'Special Report: Child Soldiers' (2003)
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military recruitment as a type of fosterage and patronage.463 For example, when the armed
forces abducted children, they did so through the motions of 'asking' for the child, even if
at gunpoint, and thereby upheld locally accepted forms of fosterage arrangements.
464
It
also made sense for orphaned and displaced children to find a patron during the war for
b . . . 11 . 1 t t' 465aSlc necessIties as we as socla pro ec IOn.
3.2.1 (a) Right to culture
Most human rights instruments guarafltee both individual rights and a right to culture.
466
Contradictions between the two are bound to arise. The concept of culture has been caught
in a considerable confusion within the human rights discourse because of diversity of its
use.467 The right to culture can be interpreted to mean either an individual's entitlement to
participate in a culture of choice or a group's entitlement to demand recognition of its
culture (and thus preservation of its cultural identity).468 Another interpretation of the right
to culture would be to allow a group to insist that its members remain true to their cultural
tradition whatever the predilection of particular individuals.469 The researcher submits that
in Sierra Leone, the right to culture in relation to child soldering has been interpreted to
mean a group's entitlement to demand recognition of its culture. As highlighted above,
childhood in the country is almost defined by various types of labour; and child labour,
besides the socio-economic practicability, is also based on cultural norms regarding
children's development.47o Children are expected to perform domestic labour from an early
age and to help adults with whatever work they are doing. Thus during war time, children
were regarded as necessary 'periph~ral participants' who perform various 'domestic'
labour for the military community.471
However, the conflict between individual and group rights is especially sensitive where
children are concemed.472 For example, harmful cultural practices, such as the practice of
463 Stovel (see note 455 above) 94.
464 [bid.
465 [bid.
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child recruitment, are in conflict with the children's individual rights which make emphasis
on non-discrimination, participation, survival and development and the best interest a of the
child.473 As highlighted above, the Western conception of childhood defers from that of
Africa.474 Most of the countries in Africa, being third world countries, cannot guarantee
the children some of the rights in the human rights treaties. For example, in African there
is a very high percentage of children that do not attend school because of either poverty or
war.475 Thus based on the socio-economic practicability and cultural norms regarding
children's development, their childhood is almost defined by various types of labour.
476
In
Sierra Leone, during the war, this socio-economic context of child labour most likely
influenced the way people understood military recruitment.
477
Under international law, children's rights, family and culture are related in a dynamic and
symbiotic relationship intended to achieve the rounded growth and development of the
child.478 However, the 'happy relationship' is endangered when practices which are
considered 'cultural' conflict with the standards set by international human rights norms.
479
The CRC, African Charter and Banjul Charter recognize the rights and duties of the family
to nurture, socialise and develop their children in a manner consistent with local values,
customs and traditions.48o In addition, State parties to the above instruments are required to
respect and protect the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents or members of the
extended family or community, as may be regulated by local custom, in ensuring the proper
socialization of the child in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her rights. 481 Furthermore,
the Af~ican Charter affirms that 'the African approach to children's rights takes cognisance
of the virtues of African cultural heritage and the values of African civilisation which
should inspire and characterise the content of the rights of the African child'.482 Thus, the
content of human rights, though founded on universal principles, have to bear the'African
473 CRC and African Charter.
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cultural fingerprint' that emphasizes group, duties, social cohesion and communal
solidarity as opposed to regard individualism.
483
The approach to international law is to favour the cultural practices that which advance the
promotion and protection of children's rights and override those cultural practices which
are considered deleterious to the protection of children's rights.
484 It is intended that such
an approach upholds children's rights whilst at the same time maintaining the cultural
integrity of the societies involved in such practices.485 In actual fact, culture does not have
a privileged status.486 International law has characterized a child's 'culture' as first being
universalized according to developmental assumptions and particularized in 'special
cases' .487 Thus, international law argues that the child has foremost a right to international
modernist culture, then to identity, and finally, in special cases, to minority and indigenous
cultures.488
Consequently, practices inconsistent with the human rights treaties, such as the recruiting
of child soldiers, are often invoked under the pretext of proper cultural upbringing.489 For
example, in Sierra Leone, child labour is based on cultural norms regarding children's
development,490 and the socio-economic context of child labour has influenced the way
people understood military recruitment.491 Thus, this has lead to the practice of child
soldiers being invoked under the norm of proper cultural upbringing. Considering the
harmful nature of the practice, it is obvious that the recruitment of child soldiers is
beneficial to the recruiters. It can be argued that the practice cannot be based on cultural
norms regarding children's development. Development of a child is defined as an 'act of
improving,;492 thus, it cannot be argued that the practice of recruitment of child soldiers is
for child development because of the consequences of the practice. For example, in the
context of traumatised youth with amputated limbs in Sierra Leone; it cannot be argued that
483 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 843.
484 Kaime (note 29 above) 228. _
485 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 842-3.
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368.
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the practice of recruitment of child soldiers is based on cultural norms regarding children's
development. In support of this contention, Bennett argues that to create what might be
called an 'Africanist' argument in sqpport of using children for military purposes is a
demoralizing view,493 because there is no culturally justification for this.
Conversely, the most important tenet of the human rights law on children is that a child's
interests are to be given paramount consideration.494 Hence, whenever the right to preserve
a culture comes into conflict with a child's interests, the latter prevail.495 Cultural practices
that might be prejudicial to a child's health or life are prohibited under human rights law.496
However, as highlighted above, the practice of child recruitment; despite the fact that it is
prohibited under international law, has gained moral authority in certain societies. Neither
international bodies nor the international community can 'assist' children whilst the
conflict is still on-going. It is unfortunate that when parties to a conflict violate
international law, there is little action that can be taken by the international community to
enforce compliance while the conflict is on_going.497 In Sierra Leone, during the war, most
children got separated from their families or were orphaned, and thus it made sense for
orphaned and displaced children to find a patron during the war for basic necessities as well
as social protection.498 The prevalent ~ractice of fosterage and norms of patronage shaped
the understandings and dynamics of children's military recruitment during the war.499
Many communities and children understood military recruitment as a type of fosterage and
patronage. 500
As highlighted above, whenever the right to conserve a culture comes into conflict with a
child's interests, the latter takes precedence. 501 However, 'the child's best interests'
principle is vague, and it can be argued that it can be an open invitation to apply whatever
cultural norms on upbringing that happen to be current. 502 Furthermore, the reality of the
application of the 'child's best interests' principle is not quite as simple as it looks on
493 Bennett (see note 44 above) 5.
494 Article 3 of the CRC and article 4 African Charter.
495 Article 21 of the African Charter and article 24(3) of the CRe.
496 Ibid.
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502 Bennett (see note 44 above) 5.
67
paper.503 At times when the international treaties are incorporated into municipal law, the
municipal law does not give any indication of whether fundamental rights, like the 'best
interest of the child' principle, supersede customary law or vice versa.
504
For example, the
constitutions of Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Botswana provide that the application of
African customary law is not subject to the prohibition on discrimination contained in the
constitution.505 Thus, ambiguities ref!lain over how to uphold human rights standards in
practice against the background of the dominance of customary practices which clash with
these standards.506 This is one of the reasons why the practice of recruitment of child
soldiers into armed forces which is contrary to principle of 'best interests of the child' has
been accepted and legitimised within the various communities in which it is practised.
507
It has been accepted that international human rights represent universal values. 508 Thus, by
implication, these values are culturally neutral. 509 However, the universal nature of human
rights has not barred attempts to temper with the modem content of 'universal' rights with
the specific cultural experiences of various societies.510 The argument that the fact that
human rights originated in western systems of law and philosophy has created problems
among African societies in relation to the acceptance of the universalism claim is
unjustifiable. 511 This is because African nations have been eager to accede to international
human rights instruments, especially the CRC. In addition, the treaty (CRC), 'with its
decidedly western slant', provided the inspiration for African Charter.512 Furthermore,
-
although Africans are entitled to preserve their cultural heritage, the welfare of children
takes priority over cultural. 513
Some African societies have defied human rights based on the presumption of securing
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human dignity within the bounds of African culture.514 However, since human dignity is
also the value underlying all human rights, this argument has an immediate plausibility.515
Nonetheless, although according to the human rights norms, the recruitment of child
soldiers into armed forces is a violation of human dignity; this is not so in accordance with
the African culture because African societies continue with the practice. This contention is
problematic because the provisions of the African Charter; which is a 'local' product, state
that the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces is a violation of human dignity. It
can be argued the reason for this discrepancy is that, although the inspiration of the African
Charter came from the CRC, the African community did not fully contemplate on the
possibility that some of the African societies would remain 'conservative'; and thus
conflicts could arise due to their actions. In addition, the implementation of
international/regional law into municipal law is by no means clear-cut. In the case of those
who believe that the two constitute distinct branches of law which never overlap (dualist
theory);516 the enforcement of international human rights into municipal law becomes
problematic.
Furthermore, a crucial question is why then have many African States ratified the
intentional treaties including those that protect children against recruitment into armed
forces. It has been argued that at times States feel pressured into signing human rights
documents because they do not want to 'look bad' in the eyes of the Western countries
whom they economically dependent on.517 Although many of the African States have
ratified these human rights documents, due to the fact that they feel that the human rights
have in a way been imposed on them, they do not see the reason why they should abide by
them;518 especially, when they feel that they have their own culturally distinctive way of
securing human dignity. 519 Thus, while the harm done to children personally is at first
sight ethically indefensible, the practice of conscripting child soldiers is being justified as
an African cultural tradition. 520
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The well intentioned attempts to protect children from abusive practices can often leave the
b .c 521 Th' . I . t .disadvantaged children even worse off than elore. e mternatlOna treatIes pu ill
place to help people can sometimes turn out not to be in their best interests after all. In the
physical sciences, it is believed that, in the long term, what's based on evidence will
prevai1.522 Nevertheless - in an ideal world - international treaties are expected to be based
on the findings obtained from research. 523 Sensational accounts of abused children draw
attention to the urgent need for intervention, but they rarely provide enough information
about the backgrounds of the children and their families to make sure that their situation is
h b ' d 524t ere y improve ,
Concerns have been raised about thtr fact that cultures might be forced or 'created' to
achieve ulterior means. 525 What is essential is the debate that even if such a tradition did
exist, it is carried on in modem times or it is recreated to serve new and contemporary
purposes.526 Evidence has shown that the purpose for which the recruitment of child
soldiers was done in early times has been lost along the way, due to ulterior motives which
are not culturally justified,527 For example, in Sierra Leone, the socio-economic context of
child labour and the practice of fosterage most likely influenced the way people understood
military recruitment. 528 However, during the 10-year civil war, the recruitment of child
soldiers in Sierra Leone was largely economically determined, and precipitated by the
competition for scarce natural resources such as timber, gold and diamonds. 529 Similarly,
the same can be said about the US. As highlighted above in part 2.4, the US allows for 17-
year-olds to be recruited into the military, but these children are not permitted to go into
active combat outside the US territory. 530 Bennett argues that culture can include, inter
alia, laws: 531 thus it can be argued that the recruitment of child soldiers by the US is a
521 Lee (see note 26 above) 19.
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523 [bid.
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culture. However, recent evidence has shown that the US has been recruiting children
under the age of 17 years in order to fill their quotas in the war in Iraq.532
However, it is not enough to identify the cultural barriers and limitations to human rights
standards; the challenge is how to achieve a balance of values.533 The articulation of
cultural rights in international treaties and the prohibition of customary practices that
conflict with human rights standards have not been successful in resolving the inherent
conflicts between human rights objectives and some dominant cultural traditions. 534 Many
African States have demonstrated a willingness to introduce legislation holding national
human rights above customs and cultural traditions where conflicts arise.535 However,
experiences have shown that formal legislative enactments alone cannot change pervasive
cultural attitudes. For example, although there are international treaties that prohibit the
recruitment of child soldiers, the practice has continued in some African States.536
The balance can be achieved by maintaining human rights standards while resolving the
obvious conflict between them and the dominant cultural traditions. 537 Furthermore, it is
even more important to appreciate the social basis of these cultural traditions and how they
may be adapted to or integrated with national legislation to promote human rights. 538 In the
case of detrimental cultural practices, solutions need to be found in consultation with
practicing communities and adequate social support should be given to individuals who
choose to abandon the practice.539 In addition, African societies are constantly in the
process of change which is shaped by a variety of cultural, social, and economic factors. 540
Dominant cultural traditions can in fact be changed in response to different internal and
external pressures. 541
3.2.1 (b) Cultural legitimacy
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The pursuit for consensus between cultural traditions and modem international legal
standards is a theme of growing interest.542 However, the crucial question in the case of
Africa is how 'this marriage of ~niversal rights and culture can be achieved' .543
International treaties have tried to compromise between two competing rights, namely, the
rights of the child and cultural rights.544 Attempts by African States to assert the
supremacy of human rights over cultural traditions where conflicts arise have been
unsuccessful. 545 For example, even though the practice of recruitment of child soldiers
into armed forces is prohibited under international law, the practice still prevails in certain
African States.546 The failure has been attributed to the fact the enactment of human rights
as universal laws alone cannot change pervasive cultural attitudes.547
Certain traditional cultures have been revived to combat certain social pandemics and to
promote and maintain cultural identity.548 Thus, one of the main reasons advanced for the
cultural practices is that it allows societies and communities to preserve their culture and
tradition.549 For example in Sierra Leone, childhood is defined by various forms of
labour;55o which is based on cultural norms of regarding children's development. 551 As a
result, during the war, this socio-economic context of child labour most likely influenced
the way people understood military recruitment;552 they participate in military activities
'within a system which made sense for children to be part of the adult activity,.553
However, as highlighted above in 3.2.1 (a) this particular practice can not be based on
cultural norms of regarding children's development because of the consequences of the
practice.
African societies have argued that Africa has its own culturally distinctive way of securing
human dignity, and thus have rejected the supremacy given to international human rights554
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It has also been argued that the adoption of Africa's heritage and values, which are rooted
in her traditional past, is more practical in order to resolve Africa's own kind of peculiar
problems.555 Therefore, the success of implementing children's rights in Africa depends to
a large extent on the level of cultural legitimacy accorded to children's rights norms.
556
To
inquire into the cultural legitimacy of human rights would be quite simply to inquire into
the kinds and degrees of support for human rights standards and for their implementation in
culture(s).557 One of the main reasons advanced for the cultural practices; such as the
recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces and female genital mutilation (FMG), even
though they are detrimental to children, is that it allows societies and communities to
preserve their culture and tradition.558 Thus, it is clear that the legitimacy and acceptability
of the modem universal human rights regime needs to be harmonized and strengthened
with the specific cultural experience of various societies.559
Many African political scholars, politicians and indeed contemporary African States seem
to have resolved that aping alien theoretical models and practices are the most appealing
option for Africa.56o However, the fact that human rights are considered 'alien' within
some African societies has led to many societies failing to accept the universalism claim.56]
This aspect exposes the conceptual errors implicit in the conflation of 'human rights' as a
concept and as practiced in different political systems.562 Hence, the practices such as the
recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces have prevailed.
'Outsiders', furthermore, perceive traditional cultures in a negative way; indigenous
African belief systems are constantly being devalued. 563 In response to this, African
societies have argued that cultural liberty is an important right.564 Traditional cultural
practices like the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces reflect values and beliefs
held by members of a community for periods often spanning generations. It is a fact that
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every social grouping in the world has specific traditional cultural practices and beliefs;
African communities are no different in this respect. 565 Thus, tradition should be preserved
and protected as an important element of African culture. However, it is illogical to
preserve a culture that has detrimental effects for a child's development. The CRC,
African Charter and Banjul Charter recognize the rights and duties of the family to nurture,
socialise and develop their children in a manner consistent with local values, customs and
traditions. 566 Thus, as highlighted above, the recruitment of child soldiers into armed
forces cannot be based on cultural norms regarding children's development.
However, the implementation of universal norms respecting children's rights within
African cultures will in some cases be hindered by practices or values which enjoy cultural
legitimacy but are contrary to children's rights. 567 For example, in Sierra Leone, the
cultural practice of recruitment of children into armed forces enjoys cultural legitimacy
unlike the human rights norms that prohibit the practice. Significantly, international human
rights cannot derive their legitimacy only from international authority but also from the
force of cultural traditions.568 Therefore, the challenge is how to implement children's
rights in a culturally appropriate manner, whilst on the other hand ensuring that harmful
practices are not protected under the pretext of cultural propriety.569 Ideally, since respect
for human rights is promoted by reason as well as by experience, a constructive approach
to promoting human rights is ideal.570 International human rights standards must be
promoted against the background of the dominant cultural and social traditions in the State;
and this should be done with due respect to meritorious cultural values and traditions of
local communities.571
Consequently, certain invasive cultural practices have been granted implicit approval in the
legislation, despite their obvious violation of fundamental human rights. 572 For example,
565 C. Twala 'The African tradition of initiation and circumcision: A curse or cure in South Africa? (2007)
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virginity testing and FGM is permitted in certain countries.
573
World Health Organization
(WHO) opposed the practice of FGM by raising concerns regarding the consent (or lack
thereof, in most cases) of the patient, and subsequently the safety and long-term
574 . h . f . f h'ldconsequences of the procedures. In the same veIn, t e practice 0 recrUItment 0 c 1 ren
into armed conflicts has been granted implicit approval in certain international treaties. For
example, as highlighted in part 2, certain international treaties allow for the recruitment of
children above the age of 15 years into armed forces.
Thus, cultural practices that are detrimental to children exist due to the fact that children's
rights norms that prohibit the practices do not enjoy cultural legitimacy. A popular
justification for the cultural practices that are detrimental to children is the need to fulfill
cultural obligations.575 For example in Sierra Leone, with the socio-economic practicality,
child labour is also based on cultural norms regarding children's development,576 Thus, the
practice of 'child soldiering' is understood differently in the local socio-economic
contexts.577 The prevalence of cultural practices over international human rights has been
justified in terms of the economic, social, cultural and political diversity that characterizes
the African societies.578
Kaime argues that for children's rights to enjoy sufficient observance and support they
have to command adequate legitimacy.579 Significantly, cultural legitimacy derives its
authority from internal validity.58o Thus, if a rule or norm does not command adequate
legitimacy it will not enjoy sufficient observance or support.581 However, to allow
detrimental cultural practices, as the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces, to
prevail due to the cultural legitimacy is absurd. Price argues that a 'weak (realist) moral
relativism as an alternative' maybe the ideal, as compared to 'the positivist-based,
absolutist morality that threatens to destroy traditional culture'. 582 As highlighted above in
part 3(a), the enactment of international human rights alone cannot change cultural
573 FGM is practised in more than 28 countries in Africa and in some countries in the Middle East and Asia.
574 World Health Organisation (WHO) 'Female genital mutilation'
http://www. who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ accessed 5 October 2009.
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practices. Reasons for the existence -of a practice have to be taken into account, and a
compromise has to be ascertained in order to protect children's rights.
3.2.1 (c) Humanitarian discourse and understanding lived realities on experiences of young
people's military recruitment
The global human rights discourse has failed to focus on specific empirical studies on the
role of culture in the development of human rights. 583 There are some culturally debatable
issues pertaining to child recruitment into armed forces which the researcher will shortly
discuss below. The cultural issues are age, child labour, fosterage, political and social
agency of children and loyalty towards family and the community. All these issues have
been used by some African societies to justify the recruitment of child soldiers as a cultural
component. The argument raised by the some African States is the fact that the practice of
recruitment of child soldiers has been revived to promote and maintain cultural identity.584
Thus, since cultural identity is one of the most important parts of a person's identity; a
person's identity will be seriously undermined if they are not permitted to follow their
culture.585
The global humanitarian and human rights discourse adopts a 'straight-18' position, which
defines a 'child' and a 'child soldier' in terms of the chronological age of 18.586 However,
the legal rationale behind the 'straight-18' position does not actually address the reasons for
the cut-off.587 There is, however, the debate between the issue of whether in lived realities
of the experiences of young people, the age 18 indeed 'marks the formal transition from
childhood to adulthood', and what people actually regard as an appropriate age for military
participation at the locallevel.588
Significantly, many African societies do not define the boundaries of childhood and
adulthood in terms of chronological age;589 the boundaries of childhood and adulthood are
defined in social terms which take pla~e progressively through rites and practices that mark
583 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 840.
584 Moodley (see note 544 above) 65.
585 MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay (see note 439 above) 493E.





· 590 h . I d fi . . I fand confirm an individual's SOCial status. T e SOCla e Imtlon most y comes rom
practical circumstances in many societies.59! For example, since many Sierra Leoneans are
not registered at birth, they might not know their exact age, and so the idea of a child
- .s:: f h 592suddenly reaching adulthood at the age of 18 would not make sense lor most 0 tern.
However, even though the local definitions of a 'child' differ from the global one; the local
definitions must conform to the global one.593
In relation to the 'straight 18' approach, the global humanitarian discourse defines
childhood as a period of innocence, dependency, and immaturity and places military
recruitment outside the realm of children.594 On the contrary, in African societies
adolescence can be a period of responsibility, since having responsibilities is culturally
regarded as beneficial to children's moral and social development,595 Many of these
societies regard military participation as a part of becoming an adult and therefore
encourage many under-18-year-olds to participate in military activities.596 Hence, this
explains why many societies may consider military recruitment of adolescent boys as
reasonable and even normal in the context of war.597 For example, in Sierra Leone, the
socio-economic context of child labour most likely influenced the way people understood
military recruitment;598 since child labour is based on cultural norms regarding children's
development.599 In this case, the global humanitarian discourse which depicts the
recruitment of under-18-year olds 'as a barbaric and universal violation of human rights' is
likely to be in conflict with the local perceptions of adolescents and their responsibilities.6oo
In many African societies children are expected to carry out 'chores' from an early age and
to help adults with whatever work they are doing. However, in addition to the socio-
economic realism, child labour is also based on cultural norms regarding children's
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development.601 Thus, during the war, this socio-cultural context of child labour most
likely influences the way people understood military recruitment.
602
Therefore, even
though during war time, the context has changed, the duties of the child in respect to the
community still remain the same.603 For example, the majority of the younger 'child
soldier' population in Sierra Leone spent their war years performing their 'normal duties'
. h ·1· . h k rt 1 . 604In respect to t e mI Itary commumty, suc as, coo s, po ers, c eaners, messengers, spIes.
In this regard, the local meanings of what is identified as 'child soldiering' are different
from the meanings attributed in the global discourse.6os
The global humanitarian discourse fails to take into account children's political and social
agency.606 The concept of agency 'refers to one's active engagement with the world and
their own efforts to cope with adversity' .607 Thus, the concept of agency is a critical one in
understanding the phenomenon of 'child soldiers.608 Children do not live in an abstract
world; they are part of the world, and what ever happens in the world has a direct impact on
them. Thus, during war time, young people often intentionally and effectively devise ways
to make the best of their unfavourable life situations.609 Thus, failure by the global
humanitarian discourse to acknowledge the concept of agency has created a gap between
itself and the complex local contexts and dynamics of 'child soldiering' .610 Lee argues that
such a gap would appear to open up the risk of programmes based on the universal
discourse which are unsuitable when implemented at the local leve1.611 For example,
demobilised ex-child soldiers chose military re-recruitment primarily for socio-economic
reasons, arising from their ongoing unemployment and destitution after the war and
demobilisation.612 According to a report by Human Rights Watch, around 2,000 of 72,490
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The above argument shows that there are two sides to the story in recruitment issues.
There is a conflict between the humanitarian discourse and the lived realities
understandings on experiences of young people's military recruitment. Thus, there is an
inconsistency between the international commitments undertaken by some African States
and beliefs of their population. The States have not done enough to deal with the societal
attitudes; they have not tried to find adequate solutions and social support for those
involved. For example, in Sierra Leone, the government has not successfully resolved the
issue of ongoing unemployment in the country. This has resulted in around 2,000 of
72,490 combatants disarmed in Sierra Leone joining armed groups in other countries.
614
The issue of 'child soldiers' in the humanitarian discourse has created a situation where the
lived realities that challenge the humanitarian discourse do not actually translate into
changes in international treaties.615 The well-intentioned humanitarian discourse on child
soldiers has disregarded the complex local understandings and experiences of military
recruitment. 616 It is not intention of the researcher to argue that the recruitment of child
soldiers into armed forces is a desirable and positive practice. However, the failure to
understand the impact that the lived realities at the local level has on child recruitment in
Africa can serve as an obstacle to the implementation and effectiveness of the relevant
international law. It is not enough to identify the conflicts between the humanitarian
discourse and the lived realities understandings on experiences of young people's military
recruitment; the challenge is how to achieve a balance.617 This requires an understanding
of the impact that the lived realities at the local level has on child recruitment in Africa,
together with solutions and adequate social support for those involved.618
3.2.1 (d) Conclusion
In conclusion it can be argued that, although the recruitment of child soldiers is prohibited
by international law, in certain countries it has become a socially accepted practice that
children get recruited into armed forces. This has been caused by the conflict between the
614 Lee (see note 26 above) 25.
615 Ibid4.
616Ibid.
617 Grant (see note 506 above) 9.
618 Ibid.
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humanitarian discourse and the lived realities understandings on experiences of young
people's military recruitment. The failure to understand the impact that the lived realities
at the local level has on child recruitment in Africa has served as an obstacle to the
implementation and effectiveness of the relevant international law. The success of
implementing children's rights in Africa depends to a large extent on the level of cultural
legitimacy accorded to children's rights norms. Attempts by African States to assert the
supremacy of human rights over cultural traditions where conflicts arise have been
unsuccessful. However, it is not enough to identify the cultural barriers and limitations to
human rights standards; the challenge is how to achieve a balance of values.
3.3 CHILD CROSS-BORDER RECRUTIMENT
Child cross-border recruitment arises whenever there is a conflict occurring in a different
country within a region, and children·are recruited from the territory of another country,
with the purpose of conscripting them into armed forces. 619 According to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict
'cross-border recruitment of children and their recycling in regional conflicts are significant
challenges in which significant numbers of children and young people are being compelled to join
armed groups and take up lives as fighters because this may provide them and their families with a
measure of protection in highly volatile and insecure settings, or in environments where war may
represent the most viable livelihood. ,620
Although the practice of child cross-border recruitment is not more serious than the general
child soldier recruitment; the justification of the focus of this study on this type of
recruitment, as will be shown below, is that cross-border recruitment has not been
adequately addressed by international documents. The Optional Protocol to the CRC in
paragraph 11 of its preamble621 and Palermo Protocol, in article 3(c), are the only
international documents that mention the recruitment across borders, and they are of
limited use in addressing cross-border recruitment. This aspect is problematic in the sense
that the existing international law provisions are difficult to apply in such situations, thus
619 Mezmur (note 11 above) 209.
620 Security Council, Report ofthe Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (2007) UN Document A/62/228.
621 Paragraph 11 of the Preamble provides 'condemning with the gravest concern the recruitment, training,
and use within and across national border children in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the armed
forces of a State... '.
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making it difficult to protect children against cross-border recruitment and to apply
enforcement and monitoring mechanrsms. The transportation of vulnerable children by
both the government and rebel groups across borders during armed conflict constitutes one
of the worst forms of child trafficking.
622
The Optional Protocol to the CRC in paragraph 11 of its Preamble condemns 'with the
gravest concern the recruitment, training, and use within and across national border of
children in hostilities by armed forces distinct from the armed forces of a State.' However,
a preamble is not a source of positive law, in contrast to the provisions that follow it. 623 A
preamble only helps with the interpretation of a treaty in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose,624 and it has no enacting forces.
In the same line, the Palermo Protocol in article 3(c) provides that 'the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
be considered 'trafficking in persons"~ Although the two treaties are the only international
documents that mention child recruitment across borders, as highlighted above, they are of
limited use in addressing the issue. Child cross-border recruitment makes the applicability
of the existing provisions of the Optional Protocol to the CRC and the Palermo Protocol
difficult because the leads in the two treaties are not followed in any substantive
.. 625
prOVISIOns.
In relation to the issue of child cross-border recruitment, the Committee on the CRC has
supported the recommendations made by the Secretary General in the report of February
2005 to call upon States to combat illicit cross-border activities harmful to children through
the development of bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements.626 In the same light,
the European Union (EU) set the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict in
622 Article 3 Ibid.
623 F. L. Morton Law, politics, and the judicial process in Canada (2001), Canada: University of Calgary
Press 223.
624 Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
625 Mezmur (note 11 above) 208.
626 Committee on the Rights of the Child 'CRC 41th session: Committee considers initial report of
Bangladesh on involvement of children in armed conflict' http://www.hrea.org/lists/child-
rights/markup/msg00377.html accesed on 5 October 2009.
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October 2003.627 It put initiatives in place to tackle the security of boundaries and borders.
Among a range of other suggestions, including collective action to control small arms and
light weaponry (SALW), it suggested at the field level the use of joint security patrols,
common border management in sensitive areas, and human rights monitoring where
. 628appropnate.
Recruitment of children in cross-border conflicts is of growing concern. Based on the UN
Reports,629 child cross-border recruitment is becoming quite wide spread in Africa. Some
of the countries in which this practice is encountered are the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda,
Republic of Central Africa, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Sudan and Sierra Leone.
63o
Although other countries in Asia and South America engage in the practice of child soldier
recruitment, the issue of cross-border child recruitment is more prevalent in Africa.
631
The
reason for this is that armed conflicts in the continent have reverberated across each
country's porous borders and have thus left children vulnerable to cross-border recruitment.
Moreover, in the case of rebel-held territories, the practice is all too common.
632
For
example, the movement of armed groups across borders to recruit children from refugee
camps continues to be alarming. Since January 2007, there has also been a surge in the
recruitment and use of Ugandan, Congolese and Rwandan children in the DRC by forces
loyal to the now-captured rebel leader, Laurent Nkunda.633 Furthermore, along the Sudan-
Chad border, both Sudanese and Chadian armed groups are recruiting children from
Sudanese refugee camps in eastern Chad, while Chadian refugee children are being
recruited by Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur.634
627 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 'Children and Armed Conflict: The Response of the
EU' http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU background papers/EU BGP 02.pdf 1, 1 accessed on 5 October 2009.
628 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on Ways to Combat
Subregional and Cross-border
Problems in West Africa (2004) UN Document S/2004/200.
629 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on children and armed
conflict in Uganda (2008) UN Document S/AC.51/2008/13, Security Council, Children and armed conflict-
Report ofthe Secretary-General (2009) UN Document A/63/785-S/2009/158 and Security Council,
Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General: DRC (2007) UN Document A/62/609-
S/2007/757.
630 Human Rights Watch 'Child soldiers' (see note 34 above).
631 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Child soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilization,
Rehabilitation and Reintegration in West Africa http://www.child-soldiers.org/library/Nov 2006 -
WestAfrica Surveydoc - FINAL.pdf accessed on 5 October 2009 and Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers Global Report on Child Soldiers 2001.
632 Sloth-Neilsen (see note 128 above) 64. _




In the DRC there are numerous actors involved in the conflict, including the armed forces
of several State parties to the CRC, rebel forces and numerous private companies.635 The
continuous conflict in DRC reflects an 'economic war'; the continuation of the conflict
having been fuelled by the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and other forms of
wealth in the DRC.636 Despite the general trend of the decrease in the number of cases of
child cross-border recruitment; the recFuitment of child soldiers into armed forces and child
cross-border recruitment is still continuing in the DRC.637 The decrease can be attributed
to several factors including 'the progress made in the implementation of the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme for children, the army integration process, the
decrease in the number of active fighting zones and persistent lobbying by child protection
networks against the recruitment of children,.638 Although the DRC government has also
been involved in this practice, it has denied this, and has shifted the blame on rebel
groups.639 For example, some of the recruitments have been blamed on the LRA. In
November 2008, 154 cases were documented following the LRA attacks in the DRC.640
The movement of armed groups across borders to recruit children from refugee and
internally displaced person camps continues to be alarming.641 For example, since the late
1980s, the armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire have
reverberated across each country's porous borders.642 Evidence has shown that children
have been recruited from refugee and jnternally displaced person camps. Ironically, these
camps were meant to be the only solution for families in certain areas to avoid their
children's recruitment by armed forces. 643 However, it is clear that refugee and internally
635 C.P. Cohen Jurisprudence on the Rights of the Child Vol III (2005), Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational
Publishers 2915.
636 Van Niekerk (see note 65 above) iv.
637 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General: Uganda and the DRC
(2008) UN Document S/2008/693.





642 Human Rights Report 'Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa Regional Warriors'




displaced person camps are now the primary recruiting grounds for child soldiers owing to
the convenient concentration of vulnerable children.
644
The lack of security around these camps is said to be an important factor that increases the
likelihood of child recruitment.645 For example, since January 2007, there has been a surge
in the recruitment of Congolese and Rwandan children in north Kivu from refugee camps
and communities in Rwanda by forces loyal to detained rebel leader, Laurent Nkunda,
during the upsurge in violence, as welt as Ugandan children from the DRC-Uganda border
areas.646 Furthermore, the detention of Laurent Nkunda has had a significant implication
for children, in terms of increased recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces, since the
rebel group has retaliated by increasing the fighting; thus in the process recruiting more
children.647
Some resident countries have tried to eliminate the practice by deploying their troops in
areas where cross-border recruitment is intensive, but this has just escalated more
violence.648 In addition, the resident countries have initiated agreements to stop the
conflicts in a bid to try and stop child cross-border recruitment. For example, in early
November 2008, stakeholders in the peace process, including representatives from the
Governments of Uganda and Southern Sudan, LRA, the United Nations, the African Union,
donor countries and civil society, met in Kampala and called upon LRA leader, Joseph
Kony, to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.649 Unfortunately, those efforts failed
and the Comprehensive Peace Agreem~nt remains unsigned.
The LRA is made up almost entirely of 12 000 children abducted from their families, and
has recently achieved global infamy in regards to cross-border recruitments. 65o In Uganda,
as of late, no cases have been attributed to the LRA because the group has not been
644 Ibid.
645 Ibid.
646 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-Genera (2009) UN Document
N63/785-S/2009/158.
647 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General: Uganda and the DRC
(2008) UN Document S/2008/693.
648 Since April 2008, escalating violence initially struck Haut-Uele District, including the town of Dungu, and
has spread into Has-Uele District since April 2009, following the deployment of troops reinforced by
MONUC and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Haut-Uele. Security Council,
Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General 'Children and armed conflict in Uganda
(2009) UN Document S/2009/462.
649 Ibid.
650 Singer (see note 426 above) 572.
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operating in Ugandan territory.651 However, disturbing new anecdotal evidence suggests
that children are being recruited from Uganda into conflicts in neighboring DRC and
Sudan.652 The presence of the LRA has been reported in eastern DRC, southern Sudan and
the Central African Republic.653 The LRA have recruited children from the DRC, Sudan
and Central Africa.654 For example, it has been reported that the LRA has abducted 159
children in the DRC.655 Thus, the LRA recruits children from the territory of another
country into conflicts in different country within a region. For example, during their attack
in the DRC, the rebel group consisted of children from Uganda, Sudan and Central
Africa.656
In February 2008, the LRA signed the Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration, but this has been of no avail since they still continue to recruit child
soldiers.657 In regards to cross-border recruitment, the agreement stated that the LRA
should recognise and appreciate the fact that child-cross border recruitment is a violation of
children's rights.658 Furthermore, these children were to be demobilised from the rebel
group. Unfortunately, on 10 April of the same year, the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony,
refused to sign the final peace agreement with the Ugandan government.659
Thus on one hand, it can be argued that since the issue of child cross-border recruitment
has not been substantively addressed by international documents, this creates an obstacle in
the implementation of international law. Unlike the municipal legislation which has
regulations to add 'flesh' to the legislation, this is not the same with the international
treaties. The provisions in international law that 'try' and address the issue of child-cross
border recruitment are limited.66o Although at times precedent from the international courts
651 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on children and armed
conflict in Uganda (2008) UN Document S/AC.Sl/2008/13.
652 Coalition to stop the use of Child Soldiers' Resisting War, Promoting Children's Rights in Africa: Getting
Kids out of the Crossfire' http://www.culturesofresistance.org/education-not-war/campaigns/child-soldiers
accessed 16 August 2009.
653 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on children and armed
conflict in Uganda (2008) UN Document S/AC.S1/2008/13.
654 [bid.
655 [bid.
656 UN News Service 'Ugandan rebel group allegedly still recruiting children - UN report'
http://www.un. org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=27152&Cr=uganda&Cr I accessed 10 October 2009.
657 Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on children and armed
conflict in Uganda (2008) UN Document S/AC.S1/2008/13.
658 Article 2 (2.6) of the Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Juba, Sudan.
659 [bid.
660 Optional Protocol to the CRC and the Palermo Protocol.
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is used to clarify or add 'flesh' to the international treaties,661 thus far, it has not happened
in relation to the issue of child cross-border recruitment.
Furthermore, States parties to the applicable international treaties that are accountable for
this practice have denied responsibility and have blamed it on rebel groups; yet they are
also engaging in this practice.662 Thus, the fact that international law is limiting in this
aspect makes it difficult to protect children in these situations, since they do not have the
full protection of the law. This omission by the international treaties has left these children
vulnerable to abuse. In response to the issue, the UN Working Group on Children and
Armed Conflict has requested the development of a strategy for increased regional joint
monitoring capability to monitor and report cross-border recruitment by LRA.
663
However, the widespread of the problem cannot per se be blamed on the fact that the issue
of child cross-border recruitment has not been addressed by international documents; the
prohibition of general child recruitment has been in international treaties, and yet
recruitment continues. Thus, although Mezmur argues that the fact that the issue of child
cross-border recruitment is not addressed 'adequately' in international treaties creates an
obstacle to the implementation of the international law under the circumstances;664 it is
clear that even substantive provisions will not curb the problem. This is because, although
there are substantiated provisions that relate to the general recruitment of child soldiers, the
practice still persists. The enforcement and monitoring mechanisms embodied within the
treaties, as highlighted in part 2, are not effective. Furthermore, State parties do not live up
to their international commitments.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The military use of children dates back to ancient times. Therefore, this shows that our
views regarding the legitimacy and morality of children's military participation is a
historical construct, shaped by particular social and political forces. 665 Thus, the fact that
the discourse of 'child soldiers' exists as a historical construct; due to evolving perceptions
661 AFRC judgment.
662 For example, although the DRC government is involved in the practice of child cross-border recruitment,
all the blame is being shifted to the LRA.
663 Coalition to stop the use of Child Soldiers' Resisting War, Promoting Children's Rights in Mrica: Getting
Kids out of the Crossfire' (see note 652 above).
664 Mezmur (see note 11 above) 209.
665 Lee (see note 26 above) 2.
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of the discourse of 'child soldiers', there is bound to be possible gaps between the global
discourse and local realities.666 This is because the global human rights discourse has
failed to focus on specific empirical ~tudies on the role of culture in the development of
human rights.667 This has lead to 'tension' between other human rights and the right to
culture, in particularly when practices which are considered to be in 'cultural' conflict with
the standards set by international human rights norms.668 However, in order to try and
resolve this 'tension', reasons for the existence of a practice have to be taken into account,
and a compromise has to be ascertained in order to protect children's rights. This requires
an understanding of the cultural context of the recruitment of child soldiers into armed
forces in Africa, together with solutions and adequate social support for those involved.
669
However, it is not enough to identify the cultural barriers and limitations to human rights
standards; the challenge is how to achieve a balance of values.67o Experiences have shown
that formal legislative enactments alone cannot change pervasive cultural attitudes.671
However, the crucial question in the case of Africa is how 'this marriage of universal rights
and culture can be achieved' .672 The success of implementing children's rights in Africa
depends to a large extent on the level of cultural legitimacy accorded to children's rights
norms.673 Significantly, international human rights cannot derive their legitimacy only
from international authority but also from the force of cultural traditions.674 Thus, the
balance can be achieved by maintaining human rights standards while resolving the
obvious conflict between them and the dominant cultural traditions.675 In the case of
detrimental cultural practices, solutions need to be found in consultation with practicing
communities and adequate social support should be given to individuals who choose to
abandon the practice.676
Furthermore, the issue of child cross-border recruitment has become wide spread in Africa.
It has been argued that the omission of child cross-border recruitment in international
666 Ibid.
667 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 840.
668 Kaime (see note 29 above) 227.
669 Ibid 221.
670 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 839.
671 Ibid.
672Ibid 843.
673 Kaime(see note 29 above) 223.
674 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 842.
675 Bourdillon (see note 432 above) 48.
676 Kaime (see note 29 above) 221.
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documents creates an obstacle to the implementation of the international law under the
circumstances. However, it is unlikely that the establishment of substantive provisions
with regards to cross-border recruitment will 'extinguish' the practice. Experience has
shown that with the general child soldier recruitment, the practice is still continuing despite
substantive provisions that prohibit this practice. Thus, it is only the change in attitude by
the government forces and rebels that engage in this practice, that will see this practice
become 'extinct'.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 CONCLUSIONS
The recruitment of child soldiers is by its very character paradoxical, in that the provisions
that relate to the recruitment of child soldiers are contradictory.677 It is therefore not
surprising that the law relating to the recruitment of child soldiers is vague and often
unclear.
In conclusion it can be argued that despite the various international treaties regulating the
practice of child recruitment, there is incontrovertible evidence that the problem is
continuing on a large scale and new challenges keep emerging.678 Regardless of the fact
that the norm on the prohibition of recruitment of children into armed forces has acquired
customary law status, recruitment has still continued. The' loopholes', vagueness and
inconsistencies of the international law relating to the recruitment of child soldiers have the
potential of creating legal uncertainty which will ultimately result in further injustice for
the child.
In addition, most of the treaties do not offer equal protection to children who are recruited
into armed forces. The issue of age is a complex one. The two Additional Protocols of
1977, the CRC and the Rome Statute prohibit recruitment of under-15s into armed forces;
whilst, the Optional Protocol to the CRC, African Charter and the ILO Convention 182
raise the minimum age of recruitment from 15 to 18. Ironically, in a number of countries
the age of majority is deemed to be ~enty_one.679 Thus, there is already some indication
of contradicting provisions between the age of majority in a number of countries and the
minimum age of recruitment into armed forces.
It can be argued that the legal uncertainty is not per se the cause of recruitment continuing.
The cause is more complex. Even though the some member States are incorporating the
international law into municipal law, these provisions are not being enforced. There is no
political willingness to enforce these laws. Furthermore, the enforcement and monitoring
mechanisms embodied in the treaties are not as effective as anticipated. Although some of
677 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 162.
678 For example, the issue of cross-border recruitment.
679 In South Africa, the Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972 has recently been amended by the Children's Act 38
of 2005 to reduce the age of majority to eighteen.
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the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have generated positive outcomes~ overall,
most of them are simply too 'weak' and this has lead to the further prejudice for the child.
Because the military use of children dates back to ancient times, it is obvious that our views
regarding the legitimacy and morality of children's military participation is a historical
construct, shaped by particular social and political factors. 68o Thus, the fact that the
discourse of 'child soldiers' exists as a historical construct; due to evolving perceptions,
there is bound to be possible gaps between the global discourse and local realities.
681
This
is because the global human rights discourse has failed to focus on specific empirical
studies on the role of culture in the development of human rights.682 This has lead to
'tension' between human rights and lhe right to culture, in particularly when practices
which are considered to be in 'cultural' conflict with the standards set by international
h . h 683uman ng ts norms.
However, it is not enough to identify the cultural barriers and limitations to human rights
standards; the challenge is how to achieve a balance of values.684 Experiences have shown
that formal legislative enactments alone cannot change pervasive cultural attitudes.685
However, the crucial question in the case of Africa is how 'this marriage of universal rights
and culture can be achieved' .686 The success of implementing children's rights in Africa
depends to a large extent on the level of cultural legitimacy accorded to children's rights
norms.687 Significantly, international human rights cannot derive their legitimacy only
from international authority but also from the force of cultural traditions.688 Thus, the
balance can be achieved by maintaining human rights standards while resolving the
obvious conflict between them and the dominant cultural traditions.689 In the case of
detrimental cultural practices, solutio~s need to be found in consultation with practicing
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communities and adequate social support should be given to individuals who choose to
b d h
. 690a an on t e practice.
Lastly, the issue of child cross-border recruitment has become wide spread in Africa. It has
been argued that the omission of child cross-border recruitment in international documents
creates an obstacle to the implementation of the international law under the circumstances.
However, it is unlikely that the establishment of substantive provisions with regards to
cross-border recruitment will 'extinguish' the practice. Experience has shown that with the
general child soldier recruitment, the practice is still continuing despite substantive
provisions that prohibit this practice. Thus, it is only the change in attitude by the
government forces and rebels that engage in this practice, that will see this practice become
'extinct' .
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to offer an equal protection to children, all treaties should maintain the age of 18,
or even a higher age, as the overall definition of a child. This will provide all children
adequate protection from recruitment into armed forces. Currently, in relation to
international law, the issue of age is complex. The two Additional Protocols of 1977, the
CRC and the Rome Statute prohibit recruitment of under-15s into armed forces. The
Optional Protocol to the CRC, African Charter and the ILO Convention 182 raise the
minimum age of recruitment from 15 to 18. The Optional Protocol to the CRC has,
nevertheless, retained 15 years as the minimum age of voluntary enlistment. Ironically, in
a number of countries the age of majority is deemed to be twenty-one.691 Thus, there is
already some indication of contradicting provisions between the age of majority in a
number of countries and the minimum age of recruitment into armed forces.
If any provisions contained in the law of a State or international law in force for that State
offer a higher standard of protection fOr children, the provisions should automatically take
precedent over any other law; whether municipal or international. In relation to this article
41 of the CRC states that if any provisions contained in the law of a Member State or
international law in force for that State are more conducive to the realization of the rights
690 Kaime (see note 29 above) 221.
691 In South Africa, the Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972 has recently been amended by the Children's Act 38
of 2005 to reduce the age of majority to eighteen.
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of the child, the provisions have to take precedence over the CRC. Although this provision
is only applicable to member States to the CRC, as highlighted above, the researcher
submits that such a standard should be used in respect to all the international treaties that
prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers. With the very diverse standards set in the
different international treaties, this standard will offer better protection to children involved
in the practice.
The validity of voluntary recruitment should not be accepted particularly in the African
context. The Optional Protocol to the CRC by allowing voluntary recruitment into a state's
armed forces of 15 years olds under article 3(3) lowers the level of protection for children
who volunteer to join governmental armed forces. 692 The voluntary participation of these
children is often a response to pressure of subtle nature.693 Children sometimes feel
compelled due to the political, social and economic conditions directing their lives to
'voluntary' join the armed forces. 694 Although the Optional Protocol to the CRC mandates
four safeguards to ensure that recruitment is voluntary, their practicality in the African
context is questionable.
In order for international law to be respected, it must set the same standards for both
Member State and non-State party forces. Article 3(3) of the Optional Protocol to the CRC
allows voluntary recruitment by the government, while article 4(1) prohibits the same from
being exercised by armed forces distinct from Member State forces. This is a creditable
step since the recruitment of child soldiers is more extensive among non-governmental
armed forces than government forces. It is clear that the Optional Protocol to the CRC has
double standards as it provides different standards for armed forces to a Member State and
non-State armed forces. 695 It is most probable that non-State armed forces will not feel
obliged to abide by a standard which is different from that imposed on the State.
When addressing the issue of child soldiers in Africa, there is a need to look beyond a set
of laws in understanding and addressing the phenomenon. Most human rights instruments
guarantee both individual rights and a right to culture. Conversely, the most important
692 Ibid.
693 Van Niekerk (see note 65 above) 65.
694 Singer (see note 426 above).
695 Bell & Abrahams (see note 96 above) 176; Singh (see note 3 above) 217; Mezmur (see note 11 above)
206-7.
92
tenet of the human rights law on children is that a child's interests are to be given
paramount consideration. Hence, whenever the right to preserve a culture comes into
conflict with a child's interests, the latter prevail. Cultural practices that might be
prejudicial to a child's health or life are prohibited under human rights law. However,
relying on global discourse on the aspect of the recruitment of child soldiers and failing to
employ this kind of engagement in the local context of their recruitment may lead to
negative consequences for the intended beneficiaries.696 Thus far, international law has not
been able to eradicate the practice of the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces.
Research has shown that there are aspects of children's recruitment into armed forces that
are not acknowledged in the global humanitarian discourse.697 Lee argues that it is
insufficient to talk about the recruitment of child soldiers simply as a clear case of barbarity
and abuse of children.698 There is need to concretize the aspirations embodied in these
standards through the implementation of programmes, projects and other interventions
which result in positive norm change.699
Furthermore, in order to ensure that international standards promote the eradication of
harmful practices, such as the recruitment of child soldiers into armed forces; it is
important to acknowledge that these practices cannot be eradicated by a simple process of
legislation of alternative norms.700 The enactment of human rights as universal laws alone
cannot change pervasive cultural attitru:ies.701 This has resulted in the pursuit for consensus
between cultural traditions and modem international legal standards becoming a theme of
growing interest,702 Practices like the recruitment of child soldiers are against the
implementation of children's rights within the African cultural context,703 Cultural values
and the reasons for the existence of such a practice must be understood before embarking
on a programme of eradication.704 Solutions towards eradication must be sourced and
drawn up in consultation with practicing communities, as opposed to merely copied from
outside.
705 It must be appreciated that eradicating deep-rooted cultural practices and
696 Bourdillon (see note 432 above) 48.
697 Lee (see note 26 above) 19.
698 Ibid.
699 Kaime (see note 29 above) 236.
700 Ibid.
701 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 857.
702 Ibid 842.




customs cannot be achieved through the adoption of one method or policy stance.
706
There
is need for multi-sectoral and collaboration approaches.707 Such a stance avoids
duplication and strengthens intervention efforts. 708
However, it is not enough to identify the cultural barriers and limitations to human rights
standards; the challenge is how to achieve a balance of values.709 The articulation of
cultural rights in international treaties and the prohibition of customary practices that
conflict with human rights standards have not been successful in actually resolving the
inherent conflicts between human - rights objectives and some dominant cultural
traditions.7lO Many African States have demonstrated a willingness to introduce
legislation holding national human rights above customs and cultural traditions where
conflicts arise. 7!! However, experiences have shown that formal legislative enactments
alone cannot change pervasive cultural attitudes. The success of implementing children's
rights in Africa depends to a large extend on the level of cultural legitimacy accorded to the
children's rights norms. 7!2 Thus, the balance can be achieved by maintaining human rights
standards while resolving the obvious conflict between them and the dominant cultural
traditions.7!3 This can be achieved by insuring that the legitimacy and acceptability of the
modem universal human rights regime is harmonized and strengthened with the specific
cultural experiences of various societies.7!4
Furthermore, it is even more important to appreciate the social basis of these cultural
traditions and how they may be adapted to or integrated with national legislation to
promote human rights.7l5 In the case of detrimental cultural practices, solutions need to be
found in consultation with practicing communities and adequate social support should be
given to individuals who choose to abandon the practice.7!6 African societies are
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economic factors. 717 Dominant cultural traditions can in fact be changed in response to
different internal and external pressures.718
The enactment of international human rights alone cannot change cultural practices.
Reasons for the existence of a practice have to be taken into account, and a compromise has
to be reached in order to protect children's rights. The success of implementing children's
rights in Africa depends to a large extent on the level of cultural legitimacy accorded to
children's rights norms. 719 For children's rights to enjoy sufficient observance and support
they have to command adequate legitimacy.72o Significantly, cultural legitimacy derives its
authority from internal validity.721 Thus, if a rule or norm does not command adequate
legitimacy it will not enjoy sufficient observance or support.722
In relation to the issue of child cross-border recruitment, the issue should be 'adequately'
addressed in international law. This will make the applicability of the relevant
international law simpler, and this will also improve on the effectiveness of the respective
treaties in this regard; especially the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms embodied
within the treaties. Furthermore, State parties need to live up to their international
commitments, instead of them also becoming perpetrators of the violation of children's
rights. This is because the 'inadequacy' is not per se the only reason why the issue of child
soldiers is wide spread in Africa; the prohibition of general child recruitment has been in
international treaties, and yet recruitment continues.
717 Ibid233.
718 Ibhawoh (see note 30 above) 841.







5.1.1 Table of documents
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 OAU Doc CABILEG/24.9/49
(1990)
Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Juba, Sudan (2007)
Charter of the United Nations (1945)
Constitution of the Republic of Botswana, 1966
Constitution of Republic of Zambia, 1991
Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 1980
Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000 OAU Doc OAU/AEC
Convention on the Rights of the Child,-1989 Doc A/RES/44/25 (1989)
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light weapons, their ammunition and other
related materials (2006)
1949 Geneva Convention I Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 31
1949 Geneva Convention Il Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 85
1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva:
United Nations 75 UNTS 135
1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
Geneva: United Nations 75 UNTS 287 (1949)
1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Geneva:
United Nations 1125 UNTS 3 (1978)
1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
Geneva: United Nations 1125 UNTS 609 (1978)
International Labour Organisation's Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 2000 ILO
Convention 182 (2000)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2002 A/RES/54/263 (2002)
96
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union (2002)
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPRlPROT (Ill)
Reporting Guidelines for State Reports AFRlCOM/HPR.5(IV)
Rules of Procedure ACHPRlRP/XIX
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998)
Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (2002)
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2000 SIRES/315 (2000)
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 1998 UN Doc A/CONF. 183/2/Add.l (1998)
UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons, 2001 UN Doc A/CONF.192/15 (2001)
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime 2000 A/RES/55/25 (2000)
UN General Assembly Resolution AIRES/47/125 (1992)
UN General Assembly Resolution AIRES/51/77 (1997)
UN Security Council Resolution 1261,1999 S/RES/1261 (1999)
UN Security Council Resolution 1314, 2000 SIRES/1314 (2000)
UN Security Council Resolution 1379,2001 S/RES/1379 (2001)
UN Security Council Resolution 1460, 2003 S/RES/1461 (2003)
UN Security Council Resolution 1612,2005 S/RES/1612 (2005)
United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 A/RES/55/25 (2000)
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
5.1.2 Reports
97
Amnesty International 'Nigeria: Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the Federal High Court
reviewing refugee status granted to Charles Taylor' (2004) AI Index: AFR 44/030/2004
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Global Report on Child Soldiers 2001.
Machel G. Report to the Secretary General on the Impact ofArmed Conflicts on Children
(1996) New York: UNICEF (1996)
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on Ways
to Combat Subregional and Cross-border Problems in West Africa (2004) UN Document
S/2004/200
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General: DRC
(2007) UN Document A/62/609-S/2007/757
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General: Uganda
and the DRC (2008) UN Document S/2008/693
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General on
children and armed conflict in Uganda (2008) UN Document S/AC.51/2008/13
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General (2009)
UN Document A/63/785-S/2009/158
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Secretary-General 'Children
and armed conflict in Uganda (2009) UN Document S/2009/462
Security Council, Children and armed conflict - Report ofthe Special Representative ofthe
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (2009) UN Document A/62/228
United Nations Association of Australian (Victorian Division) 'Humanitarian Intervention-
Responsibility to Protect: Position Paper - The Republic of Liberia' RMIT University
Model UN Conference 2006
5.1.3 Cases
Ex parte Johannesburg City Council 1975 (1) SA (W)
MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) 493E
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubango Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06
Prosecutor v Charles Taylor SCSL-03-01-PT
Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & Santige Borbor Kanu SCSL-04-
16-T
Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa SCSL-04-14-T
Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-T
98
Union and Rock Insurance Co. Ltd. v Carmichael's Executor 1917 AD 593
5.2 Secondary sources
5.2.1 Books
Brett, R. & Specht, 1. Young soldiers: Why they choose to fight (2004), Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004
Cohen, C.P. Jurisprudence on the Rights of the Child Vol III (2005), Ardsley, N.Y.:
Transnational Publishers, 2005
Cohn, 1. and Goodwin, G.S. Child Soldiers - The Role of Children in Armed Conflict
(1994) New York: Oxford University Press, 1994
Dinstein Y. 'The Conduct of Hostilities under Law of International Armed Conflict' (2004)
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004
Dugard, J. International law: a South African perspective (2005) South Africa: Juta, 2005
Grotuis, H. The Rights ofWar and Peace Book III (2005), Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund,
2005
Happold, M. Child Soldiers in International Law, (2005) Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2005
Holzgrefe, J.L. & Kedane RO Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and political
dilemma (2003), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003
Machel, G. The impact ofwar on children (2001), London: Hurst & Company, 2001
South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002), Cape Town: Oxford University Press
Southern Africa, 2002
Morton, F.L. Law, politics, and the judicial process in Canada (2001), Canada: University
of Calgary Press, 2001
Mubangizi, J.C. 'The protection of human rights in South Africa: A legal and practical
Guide' (2004) South Africa: Juta, 2004
5.2.2 Chapter in book
Harvey, R. 'Section 1: Overview of international law and developments' in Children and
Armed Conflict: A guide to international humanitarian law and human rights (2003)
Montreal, Canada: International Bureau for Children's Rights, 2003
Human Rights Watch Country Reports 'Human Rights Children's Rights Project, The
Scars of Death: Children adbucted by the Lord's Resistance in Uganda' (1997) trans
99
Steiner HJ. & Alston P., International Human Rights in Context:Law, Politics, Morals
(2000) 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000
Stavrou, S. et al ' The Reintegration of Child Soldiers and Adducted Children: A case
study of Palaro and Pabbo Gala Districtn Northern Uganda' in Bennett, E. et al (eds) ACT
Against Child Soldiers in Africa (2008) Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000
Stavrou, A. 'Youth Citizenship and Mobilisation in Uganda', in Mclntyre, A.and Ebo, A.
(eds) Invisible Stakeholders: The Impact of War on Children (2004) Pretoria:Institute for
Security Studies, South Africa, 2004
Sloth-Nielsen, 1. 'Children's rights and the law in African context: An introduction' in J.
Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children's Rights in Africa: A legal perspective (2008), Burlington:
Ashgate, 2008
Mezmur B.D. 'Children at Both Ends of the Gun: Child Soldiers in Africa' in 1. Sloth-
Nielsen (ed) Children's Rights in Africa: A legal perspective (2008), Burlington: Ashgate,
2008
5.2.3 Journals
Alusala, N. 'ECOWAS small arms and light weapons convention: Examining
implementation' (2008) 1(4) Arms Control: Africa 14
Amoah, J. & Bennett, T. 'The freedoms of religion and culture under the South African
Constitution: Do traditional African religions enjoy equal treatment?' (2008) 8(2) African
Human Rights Law Journal 357
Ang F. 'Article 38 Children in armed conflict: A Commentary on the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of a Child' (2005) 1
Apuuli, K.A. 'Amnesty and International Law: the case of the Lord's Resistance Army
insurgents in Northern Uganda' African Journal on Conflict Resolution (2005) 5(2) 33
Ayissi, A. 'Protecting children in armed conflict: from commitment to compliance' (2002)
3 Children and Security 5
-
Baker, A. and Ben-Ari, H. 'The Use ofChildren in Armed Conflict' (2000) 26 Justice 7
Bell, K. & Abrahams, D. 'The use of child soldiers in armed conflict' (2008) Obiter 162
Ben-Ari, E. 'Facing child soldiers, moral issues, and 'real soldiering': anthropological
perspectives on professional armed forces' (2009) 37(1) Scientia Militaria: South African
Journal ofMilitary Studies 1
Bennett, T.W. 'Using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African tradition?
Criminalising the recruitment of child soldiers' (1998) 32 Institute of Security Studies
Monograph 1
100
Berrigan, F. 'Big battles over small arms: But progress at the United Nations is too slow'
(2006) 15(2) African Security Review 116
Bodansky, D. 'Special Court of Sierra Leone-International Criminal law-Crimes against
humanity-War Crimes-Recruitment and use of child soldiers' (2007) American Journal
ofInternational Law 848
Bourdillon, M. 'How bad is 'child labour'?: Viewpoint' (2008) 4(3) Quest 48
Boyden, J. 'Children, War and World Disorder in the 21st Century: A Review of the
Theories and the Literature on Children's Contributions to Armed Violence' (2006) 138
Working Paper Series 1
Brandy, C. 'Street Sociology and Pavement Politics: Aspects of Youth and Student
Resistance in Cape Town, 1985' (1987) 13(3) Journal ofSouthern African Studies 303
Cahn, N. 'Poor children: child "witches" and child soldiers in sub-Saharan Africa' (2006)
Ohio State Journal ofCriminal Law, 413
Chirwa, D.M. 'The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child' (2002) 10 The International Journal ofChildren's Rights 157
Cilliers, J. & Sturman, K. 'Challenges facing the AD's Peace and Security Council' (2004)
13(1) African Security Review 97
De Beer, W. 'When to intervene to save lives: international law' (2008) 8(3) Without Prejudice
60
Duncan, N. & Bowman, B. 'Educational aspirations, child labour imperatives and
structural inequality in the South African agricultural sector: Research Article' (2008)
26(3) Perspectives in Education 29
Fayemi, A. 'Towards an African theory of democracy' (2009) Research Review 1
Francis, D. 'Paper protection mechanisms: child soldiers and the international protection of
children in Africa's conflict zones' (2007) 45(2) Journal ofModern African Studies 207
Forte, D. 'From words to deeds: Addressing peacekeepers' violations of human rights'
(2006) 3 Conflict Trends 44
Grant, E. 'Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa' (2006)
50(1) Journal ofAfrican Law 2
Gueli, R. 'Humanitarian intervention in Africa: towards a new posture' (2004) 32(1)
Scientia Militaria : South African Journal ofMilitary Studies 120
Gurnell, D.R. 'Briewe - 'Community service - or conscription" (2003) 93(2) South African
Medical Journal 84
101
Heyns, C. 'The African regional human rights system: In need of reform?' (2000) 1(2)
African Human Rights Law Journa1l55
Hopkins, K. 'The effect of an African Court on the domestic legal orders of African States'
(2002) 2(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 234
Honwana, A. 'Negotiating Post-War Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola'
1999(1) CODESRlA Bulletin
Ibhawoh, B. 'Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of
Human Rights in the African State' (2000) 22.3 Human Rights Quarterly 838
Kaime, T. 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of
children's rights in Africa: Some reflection' (2005) 5 (2) African Human Rights Law
Journal 221
Kalis, A.M. 'Child soldiers in Africa: solutions to a complex dilemma' (2002) 2 (2) African
Journal on Conflict Resolution 1
Kent, V.L. 'Examining the UN's plans to eliminate and address cases of sexual exploitation
and abuse in peacekeeping operations: peacekeepers as perpetrators of abuse: essay' (2005)
14(2) African Security Review 85
Lee, A. 'Understanding and Addressing the Phenomenon of 'Child Soldiers': The Gap
between the Global Humanitarian _Discourse and the Local Understandings and
Experiences of Young People's Military Recruitment' (2009) 52 Refugee Studies Centre 1
Lloyd, A. 'Report of the second ordinary session of the African Committee of Experts on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child: recent developments' (2003) 3(2) African Human
Rights Law Journal 329
Llyod, A. 'How to gurantee credence; Recommendations and proposals for the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child' (2004) 12 International
Journal ofChildren 's Rights' 21
Madhavan, S. 'Fosterage patterns in the age of AIDS: continuity and change' (2004) 58
Social Science & Medicine 58 1443
Marlowe, A, & Oosterveld, V. 'International Decision: Special Court for Sierra Leone-
International Criminal Law-Crimes Against Humanity-War Crimes-Recruitment and Use
of Child Soldiers' (2007) 101 American Journal ofLaw 848
Mazurana, D. and McKay, S. 'Child soldiers: What About Girls? (2001) 57(5) Bulletin of
the Atomatic Scientists 1
McIntyre, A. 'African children in armed conflict: bridging right and reality' (2003)
1(2) Commonwealth Youth and Development 5
McIntyre, A. 'Rights, root causes and recruitment: The youth factor in Africa's armed
conflicts' (2003) 12 African Security Review, 93
102
Mekonnen, D.R. & Pretorius, lL. 'Prosecuting the main perpetrators of international
crimes in Eritrea : possibilities under international law' (2008) 33(2) Journal for Juridical
Science 76
Mezmur, B.D. 'The 9th ordinary session of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child: looking back to look ahead: recent development' 2007 7(2)
African Human Rights Law Journal 54_5
Mezmur, B.D. 'The African Children's Charter versus the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child: a zero-sum game? '(2008) 23(1) SA Publiekreg = SA Public Law 1
Moodley,1. 'Customary initiation rites and the Children's Act 38 of2005' (2008) 23(1) SA
Publiekreg = SA Public Law 65
Musila, G.M. 'Challenges in establishing the accountability of child soldiers for human
rights violations: Restorative justice as an option' (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law
Journal 321
Muzuzi, lD, 'An analysis of the approach to the right to freedom from torture adopted by
the African Commission on Human Rights and People's Rights' (2006) 5(2) African
Human Rights Law Journal 423
Naldi, G.l 'Interim measures of protection in the African system for the protection of
human and peoples rights' (2002) 2(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 1
Ndungu, 1. 'Measuring the impact of arms control agreements in Africa: National reports
on the United Nations programme of action on small arms and light weapons in Africa'
(2008) 1(4) Arms Control: Africa 9
Okereke, C.N. 'Implementing the ECOWAS convention on small arms and light weapons:
Challenges and prospects' (2008) 1(4) Arms Control: Africa 11
Omotola, J. 'The Sierra Leone Lome Peace Accord' (2007) 3 Conflict Trends 38
Quee, A. 'Regional Child Warriors in West Africa' (2008) Conflict Trends 3
Price, L. 'Conserving (not preserving) culture: Avoiding the damage to culture of veiled
moralism in HIV education' (2009) The Southern African Journal ofHIV Medicine 12
Rialize, F. 'Child soldiers in African Wars' 2009 7(1) Commonwealth Youth and
Development 37
Schultheis, A 'African Child Soldiers and Humanitarian Consumption' (20) Peace Review:
A Journal ofSocial Justice 31
Sesay, A. et al 'Liberian Child Coldiers: Prospects and Problems' (2000) 30(1) Scientia
Militaria 44
103
Shepherd, A. 'Child soldiers: Is the optional protocol evidence of an emerging "straight-
18" consensus?' (2000) International Journal ofChildren's Rights 37
Shepler, S. 'Conflicted Childhoods: Fighting Over Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone' Thesis
(Ph.D.). Department of Social and Cultural Studies in Education, University of California
Berkeley 1
Singer, P.W. 'Talk is che~p: Getting serious about preventing child soldiers' (2004) 37
Cornell International Law Journal 561
Singh, D. 'When a child is not a child: The scourge of child soldiering in Africa' (2007) 7
African Human Rights Law Journal 206
Sloth-Nielsen, 1. & Mezmur, B.D. 'Win some, lose some: the 10th ordinary session of the
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child' 2008 8(1) African
Human Rights Law Journal 207
Sloth-Nielsen, 1. & Mezmur, B.D. 'Out of the starting blocks: the 12th and 13th sessions of
the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child' (2009) 9(1)
African Human Rights Law Journal 336
Stovel, L. 'Long road home: Building reconciliation and trust in post-war Sierra Leone'
(2006) Thesis (Ph. D.), Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser
University 1.
Tefferi, H. 'Reconstructing Adolescence after displacement: Experience from East
Africa'(2007) 21 Children & Society 297
Tiefenbrum, S. Child soldiers, slavery and the trafficking of children' (2008) Fordham
International Law Journal 415
Twala, C. 'The African tradition of initiation and circumcision: A curse or cure in South
Africa? (2007) 21 (1) S.A. Tydskrifvir Kultuurgeskiedenis 22
Twun-Dauso, A. 'Africa's Young Sold-iers: The Co-option of Childhood' (2003) 82
Institute for Security Studies Monograph 1
Utas, M. 'Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War' (2003) Thesis (Ph.D.),
Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University, Uppsala,
Sweden 1
Yarchyk, B. 'Compliance decisions with regards to the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the two Optional Protocols: Reflections on the theories of international law'
(2008) Honours Thesis, Ohio State University 1
Van Niekerk, N. Weak States and Child Soldiering in Africa: Contextual Factors (2003)
University of Stellenbosch 1
Zandman H.J.G. 'Economic sanctions: An ethical primer' (2008) 42(3) In die Skriflig 531
104
Zounmenou, D. The United Nations response to the phenomenon of child soldiers in
Africa: case studies of Mozambique and Sierra Leone (2001) University of the
Witwatersrand 1
5.2.4 Electronic Media
'Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative Abducted and Abused: Uganda'
www.acholipeace.org accessed 25 March 2007
Amnesty International 'DRC: Children at war, creating hope for the future'
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sidlYAOI-6UG58J?OpenDocument accessed on
12 June 2009
BCC News 'AK-47: the Sierra Leone child soldier'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4500358.stm accessed on 5 October 2009
Brownback, S. & Steams, R.E. 'Africa's Forgotten War' Washington Times (2005)
http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/200.50308-094l29-9853r.htill accessed 19 June 2009
Committee on the Rights of the Child 'CRC 41 th session: Committee considers initial
report of Bangladesh on involvement of children in armed conflict'
http://www.hrea.orgllists/child-rights/markup/msg00377.html accessed on 5 October 2009
CSR Alerts 'The official defmition of a child soldier from the Cape Town Principles'
http://childsoldierrelief.com/2008/07/22/official-definition-of-a-chiId-soldier-from-cape-
town-principles/ accessed on 14 February 2009
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Child soldiers and Disarmament,
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in West Africa http://www.child-
soldiers.orgllibrarylNov 2006 -WestAfrica Surveydoc - FINAL.pdf accessed on 5
October 2009
Coalition to stop the use of Child Soldiers 'Resisting War, Promoting Children's Rights in
Africa: Getting Kids out of the Crossfire' http://www.culturesofresistance.org/education-
not-war/campaigns/child-soldiers accessed 16 August 2009
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers'Africa Report' 200 I htpp://www.child-
soldier.orglreports africa/executive summary.htm accessed on 14 February 2009
Fontanini, F. 'Liberia's child soldiers relive lost childhood in Sierra Leone'
http://www.hrea.orgllists/child-rights/markup/msgOO 166.html accesed on 7 February 2009
Hoskins, E. & Nutt, S. 'The humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Burundi'
http://www.watsoninstitute.orglpub/OP29.pdf accessed 1 October 2009




Human Rights Watch 'Youth, Poverty; and Blood: The lethal legacy of West Africa's
regional warriors' (2005) http://hrw.org/reports/2005/westafrica0405 accessed on 26 April
2009
Human Rights Watch 'Child soldiers' http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm
accessed on 8 February 2009
Human Rights Watch 'DRC: ICC's First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers'
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/drc-icc-s-first-trial-focuses-child-soldiers
accessed on 8 February 2009
Human Rights Watch 'More than 120,000 child soldiers fighting in Africa'
http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/apr/cs0419.htm accessed on 8 February 2009
Human Rights Watch 'Nepal: Maiosts should release child soldiers'
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/l1/27 accessed on 12 November 2008
Human Rights Watch 'Stop the use of child soldiers: Facts about child soldiers'
http//:www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm accessed on 29 February 2009
Human Rights Watch 'UN: Security Council must punish users of child soldiers'
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006Lll/27 accessed on 7 February 2009
Human Rights Watch 'Uganda'
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403-02.htm#TopOfPage accesed 8
February 2009
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 'More African countries sign
EPAs with EU, as leaders quarrel at Lisbon summit'
http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/6603/ accessed 5 October 2009
International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 'International Humanitarian Law (IHL)'
http://www.icrc.org/Eng/ihl accessed on 20 August 2009
International Committee of Red Cross 'Member States to the Following International
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 26-Aug-2009'
'http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/CSPF)/party main treaties/$File/IHL and other related Tre
aties.pdf accessed on 26 August 2009
International Committee of Red Cross 'International Humanitarian Law - Treaties &
Documents' http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflPays?ReadForm accessed on 26 August 2009
ICRC 'International Humanitarian Law (IHL)' http://www.icrc.orglEng/ihl accessed on 20
August 2009
IRINnews.org 'Too small to be fighting in anyone's war'
http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/childsoldiers/default.asap accessed 5 February 2009
Khulumani Support Group 'Brief Overview of the Khulumani Lawsuit'
http://www.khulumanLnet/attachments/343 Khulumani%20Joint%20Press%20Statement
106
%20-%20Notice%200f%20Press%20Conference%203Sep09.pdf accessed on 3 September
2009
Khulumani Support Group 'Ignoring ICC warrant is 'unconstitutional"
http://www.khulumani.net/in-the-medi~news/news-2009/341-ignoring-icc-warrant-is-
unconstitutional.html accessed on 3 September 2009
Lederer, E. 'Darfur children endure 'unspeakable acts of abuse'
htpp://www.mg.co.zalartic1epage.aspx?area=/breaking news/breaking n.. ./&articleid=305
12. accessed on 7 February 2009
Mail & Guardian online 'The trouble with human rights in Africa'
http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/bryanmukandi/2008/12/09/the-trouble-with-human-right-
in-africal accessed on 5 October 2009
OCHA 'Special Report: Child Soldiers' (2003)
http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Child-Soldiers-IRINln-Depth.pdf accessed on 5
October 2009
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict'Advocacy' http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/theoffice.html accessed
03 June 2009
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict 'Country visits' http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/theoffice.html
accessed 03 June 2009
Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict "Working with
partners' http://www.un. org/children/conflict/english/workingwithpartners.html accessed
on 29 June 2009
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and armed
conflict 'Machel study 10-year strategic review:Children and conflict in a changing world'
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/machellO.html accessed on 6 February 2009
ReliefWeb 'The use of child soldiers in Africa: An overview. United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)' (2001)
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/chilsold.html accessed 5 October 2009
Reteurs AlertNet 'Nigerian rebel leaders give up arms in amnesty deal'
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L3428248.htm accessed 31 October 2009
Singer, P.W. & Myers, J.1. 'Children at war'
http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5098.html accessed on 7 February 2009
Stohl, R. 'Children soldiering is the worst form of child labour' Centre for Defense
Information (2000) http://www.cdi.org accessed 1 October 2009
The Economists 'Daddy Wore A Blue Helmet' www.economist.com accessed on 12
November 2008
107
The International Save the Children Alliance position on an Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Chid regarding the use and the recruitment of children in
hostilities' http://www.scslat.org accessed 1 October 2009
The UN Works for Kids 'Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone'
http://www.un.org/works/goingon!soldiers/goingon soldiers.hunl accessed 5 October 2009
UNHR 'International Humanitarian Law"
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterestlPages/Inten1ationalLaw.aspx accessed on 20
August 2009
UNICEF 'Special concerns' http://www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm accessed 31 October
2009
UNICEF 'The 'Rights' Start to Life: A Statistical Analysis of Birth Registration' (2005)
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/BirthRegIOa rev.pdf accessed 14 February 2009
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 'Children and Armed Conflict: The
Response of the EU' http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU background papers/EU BGP 02.pdf
1, 1 accessed on 5 October 2009
UN News Service 'Ugandan rebel group allegedly still recruiting children - UN report'
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27152&Cr=uganda&Crl accessed 10
October 2009
World Health Organisation (WHO) 'Female genital mutilation'
http://www.who. intlmediacentre/factsheets/fs241 /en! accessed 5 October 2009
UNICEF 'Children at both ends of the gun' http://www.unicef.org/graca/kidsoldi.htm
accessed 5 October 2009
UNICEF 'Special concerns' http://www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm accessed 31 October
2009
108
